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TOWARD A FOUNDATIONAL THEORY OF
WORKERS' RIGHTS:
THE AUTONOMOUS DIGNIFIED WORKER
Anne Marie Lofaso*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Perspectives on the Worker's Nature
Employment shapes human life and experience. Employment defines
individuals in relation to others as economic, social, and even political actors in
shared communities. For example, in a capitalist society, where the means of
production are privately owned, property owners normally pay wages (and
sometimes benefits) to individuals in exchange for their labor. Paid work permits
workers, who have produced the goods or services, to act as economic consumers
by using those wages to purchase other workers' goods and services.
An oftentimes neglected aspect of employment-unemployment-shapes
human life as well. Employment loss, for whatever reason, can have devastating
effects extending beyond the individual, to the family and to the community.
Rising unemployment rates and lower wages have been linked to higher crime
rates, at least among less-educated men, and even correlated with higher divorce
rates. Decreasing tax revenues from higher unemployment rates means less
government money to spend on social services to the poor.
The relationship between the labor market and social welfare has been
observed for some time. A century ago, in 1909, Lord William Henry Beveridge
(1879-1963), founder of the modern British welfare state, linked unemployment
with social relationships, by identifying unemployment as a problem "at the root
of most other social problems."' Indeed, Lord Beveridge viewed employment
security coupled with collective responsibility as the foundation for social action
and labor as the instrument by which people could act together responsibility to
build society.2
Searching for answers to these questions inevitably leads to the observation
that employment defines self. In other words, the answer to the question "What
do you do?" helps answer the question "Who am I?" In that vain, employment
defines individuals in relation to oneself, to others in the community, and to other
community members. As Lord Beveridge explained, during job loss, "selfrespect is endangered." 3

*Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. This article is dedicated to my
labor law mentor, Clyde W. Summers. I wish to thank C. Edwin Baker, Sandra Fredman, Mark
Freedland, Paul Davies, and Simon Deakin for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this
article. I also thank Robert M. Bastress, Jim McLaughlin, andr6 douglas pond cummings, Jeff
Hirsch, Peter Winkler, Scott Grogan, Jason Walta, and Stacy Zimmerman for commenting on a
more recent draft. Special thanks to Kate Hartung and Paul Hudson Jones for their research
assistance. Of course, all views and errors are the author's.
1 W.H. BEVERIDGE, UNEMPLOYMENT: A PROBLEM OF INDUSTRY 1 (Longmans, Green and Co. 1930)
(1909).
2See id.
3
Id. at 230.
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Modem thinkers have also linked employment and unemployment with the
self. British economist, Richard Layard, for example, argued in 1986 that "[o]nly
a job can make [the unemployed] feel needed and socially useful. ' A Nobel Prize
winning Neo-Keynesian economist, Robert Solow, in 1990, characterized the
unemployed as those who "suffer a loss of income, often deterioration of skills,
and sometimes a period of unpleasant uncertainty about the... future."5 Simply
put, the self cannot be ignored in examining questions about employment gain
and loss.
B. The Role of the Rule of Law
The law in a capitalist society often bypasses these aspects of the employed
person's multi-faceted nature, focusing instead on workplace problems from a
different perspective-that of the property owner, the capitalist, or the manager.
Viewing workplace problems through these lenses generates a different set of
questions: Is this labor regulation efficient? Does it infringe on entrenched
property rights of property owners?
Does it infringe on management
prerogatives?
I wish to challenge this way of thinking. To do this, it is necessary to view
employment from less obvious perspectives-from not only the perspective of
the employed worker but also that of the unemployed worker. This may seem
wrong. After all, examining the question of what role the law should play in
governing workplace rules is odd enough (in a capitalist society) when viewed
from the worker's perspective, but examining that question from the perspective
of the unemployed seems altogether irrelevant. Nevertheless, the unemployed
person's perspective should shed light on many overlooked questions, if only by
exposing questions that would otherwise remain unasked.
I begin by recognizing that the nature and extent of any legal right is only a
reflection of the value attached by the political system to sundry, often
conflicting, interests. Our legal system promotes a fairly free market economy.
My starting point then is the free market. By locating the values underlying a
free market economy (which have been influential in the development of U.S.
labor and welfare law), I demonstrate weaknesses in the theory-overlooked
values-and then begin to rebuild a legitimate place for legal regulation of labor,
employment, and welfare law. For inspiration, I draw upon the ideas of those
who argue that the market not only fails to distribute goods efficiently, but also
violates significant human rights.6 Those thinkers advocate intervention on two
grounds. First, a minimum floor of rights empowers workers to prevent gross
violations of human rights and reconcile economic with social goals.7 Second,

4 RICHARD LAYARD, How To BEAT UNEMPLOYMENT 2 (1986).
5 ROBERT M. SOLow, THE LABOR MARKET AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 28 (1990).
6

See Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Rights vs. Efficiency? The Economic Case for

TransnationalLabourStandards, 23 INDus. L.J. 289 (1994).
7 See SIMON DEAKIN & FRANK WILKINSON, LABOUR STANDARDS - ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL PROGRESS (1996); Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 305-07.
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these rights produce results no less efficient and, perhaps more efficient, than the
free market.
The following section, Section II, analyzes the free market model. I argue
that the free market is built on a broad set of values grounded primarily in liberty
as freedom from coercion; an unregulated free market; justice as formal justice
constrained by the rule of law; efficiency; and rational wealth maximization.
Free market thinkers often advocate a minimal welfare state with little or no
wealth redistribution; monetary policies to lower natural unemployment rates; 9
and state interference into personal conduct to determine whether welfare
claimants are worthy of assistance. Free market thinkers tend to prefer individual
over collective bargaining and a unitary system of business-decision-making
where management's decisions reign supreme within a large universe of
management prerogatives. To control labor supply, these thinkers advocate a
dual labor market consisting of a core and peripheral workforce. And possibly to
maintain a large supply of workers for that flexible, peripheral work force, these
thinkers advocate only minimal state aid to those in need of assistance.
Section III critiques the conventional free market view. I show that, on
closer inspection, the free market model is not so coherent but reveals
inconsistencies over which conception of efficiency- production efficiency;
allocative or Pareto efficiency; Pareto superiority; or Kaldor-Hicks efficiencyshould be used to judge conduct. I also show that each conception has its own
problems, many of which are caused by defining efficiency from the employer's
perspective.
Section IV examines the feasibility of creating a property right in labor-a
right to work. Although I am sympathetic to this idea, I reject it as currently
impractical in a market-based economy where property rights are judicially
created by individuals who are generally invested in wealth accumulation. Thus,
in societies, like the U.S. or the U.K., judges-who tend to identify with private
property owners-would inevitably choose to protect the property rights of the
owners of capital over the property rights of the owners of labor.
Sections V and VI develop a novel theory of grounding workers' rights in
two values: autonomy as promoting an individual's freedom to become part
author of his or her working life and dignity as promoting each individual as
having equal moral worth. I show that these values are consistent with policies
promoting employee participation at the board-level; employee ownership of the
means of production; works councils; collective bargaining; due process rights
and other means of compensating workers for lost employment; a statutory floor
of rights; and a well-developed welfare state. These values, working in concert,
tend to generate procedural and substantive rights working together to promote
what I call, the autonomous dignified worker.

8 See DEAKIN & WILKINSON,

supra note 7; Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 292.

9 The natural unemployment rate is the "lowest rate of unemployment that an economy can sustain
over the long run." Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/naturalunemployment.asp
(last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
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Section VII examines the values underlying three welfare models-needsbased, contributions-based, and rights-based-in search of a model that most
closely values the autonomous dignified worker. I conclude that the rights-based
model is most consistent with promoting the autonomous dignified worker and
that such a system justifies wealth redistribution.
Section VIII proposes a modest social action program--changes that can be
accomplished within in a capitalist framework. It also reveals my plan for future
articles that will detail other changes needed to be made to promote the
autonomous dignified worker.
II. THE FREE MARKET MODEL
A. Overview
Modem economists and lawyers have devised free market theories to solve
work place problems. Professor Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992), winner of the
1974 Nobel Prize in economics, authored one of the most influential of these.
Although the theories of no one individual typify all aspects of free market
theory, Hayek's views, which actually shaped the labor policies of a real
sovereign nation-the United Kingdom between 1979 and 1996, when the Tory
Government was in power-are a credible starting point.'0 I incorporate the
views of other well-known economists and economists of law to flesh out the
free market model.
B. Values Underpinning Free Market Theory
1. Hayekian Liberty
The central principle behind Hayek's theory is that liberty can be broadly
defined as freedom from coercion." Hayek defines coercion as the state of
choosing "to serve the ends of another" "to avoid a greater evil.' 2 Hayekian
liberty is the freedom to choose not to serve the ends of another or freedom to
avoid serving another to avoid a greater evil.' 3 Hayek develops his liberty theory
to show that government interference
into the personal and business affairs of the
4
people should be minimal.'

'oSee, e.g., Lord Wedderburn, Freedom ofAssociation and Philosophiesof Labour Law, 18 INDUS.
L.J. 1, 7-17 (1989) ("the pedigree and meaning of the new labour laws of the 1980s can be found in
a unique and astonishing manner in the writings of Hayek").
" See FRfEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CoNsTrruloN OF LIBERTY 11-12 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1990)
(1960).
12 d at 20-21.
13id.
14 This

view of liberty brings to mind the arguments made by the Supreme Court justices who
imposed the Lochner doctrine during the early twentieth century. See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (finding state statute limiting the working time of bakers to be arbitrary interference into the
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2. Spontaneous Order
A spontaneous order, also known as unregulated or undesigned order, is a
structured phenomenon that results from human action but not from human
design. 15 A spontaneous order is distinct from both a natural order, such as the
human eye, and also from human design, such as a clock, the Verrazano Bridge
or the Empire State Building. For Hayek, examples of a spontaneous order
include the common law (as opposed to regulatory or civil law) and the free

freedom of contract in violation of the fourteenth amendment); see also Gompers v. Buck's Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 420, 438-39 (1911) (finding that publishing a labor controversy over
labor hours in a labor newspaper by placing employer on the "unfair" and "We Don't Patronize"
lists amounts to a boycott of employer's business and an unlawful restraint of employer's trade);
Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (holding that a federal statute barring interstate employers from
making non-union status a condition of employment or basis of termination was an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty and property); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 275, 293 (1908) (holding worker
combination to be Sherman Antitrust Act 1890 violation because it "obstructs the free flow of
commerce between the states" and "restricts ... the liberty of the trader to engage in business.");
see generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND

THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT INAMERICA, 1880-1960, at 11-31 (1985).
As Professor Robert Bastress pointed out to me, perhaps the best articulation of this position can be
found in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1915), where, in the context of reaffirming an
employer's right to terminate the employment relationship because of an employee's union
membership, the Court wrote:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will be
inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a
contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This applies to all contracts,
and not merely to that between employer and employee. Indeed, a little reflection will
show that wherever the right of private property and the right of free contract coexist,
each party when contracting is inevitably more or less influenced by the question
whether he has much property, or little, or none; for the contract'is made to the very
end that each may gain something that he needs or desires more urgently than that
which he proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-evident that, unless all
things are held in common, some persons must have more property than others, it is
from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of
private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities
of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights. But the 14th
Amendment, in declaring that a state shall not 'deprive any person of... liberty, or
property without due process of law,' gives to each of these an equal sanction; it
recognizes 'liberty' and 'property' as coexistent human rights, and debars the states
from any unwarranted interference with either.
And since a state may not strike them down directly, it is clear that it may not do so
indirectly, as by declaring in effect that the public good requires the removal of those
inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise, and then
invoking the police power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object in
view. The police power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot be given the
wide scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying the constitutional
guaranty.
15See F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES INPHILOSOPHY: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 96-105 (1967).
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market.16 Indeed, Hayek borrowed the concept of spontaneous order from Adam
Smith (1723-1790), who wrote in terms of an "invisible hand" to describe the
free market. 17 As 1991 Nobel Prize recipient, Ronald Coase, wrote in his prize
lecture: "A principal theme of The Wealth of Nations was that government
regulation or centralised planning were not necessary to make an economic
system function in an orderly way. The economy could be co-ordinated by a
system 18
of prices (the "invisible hand") and, furthermore, with beneficial
results."
3. Formal Justice and the Rule of Law
For Hayek, spontaneous orders and justice are not directly related concepts.
Hayek begins with the assumption that "only human conduct can be called just or
unjust."' 19 For Hayek, then, it is incorrect to apply any conception of justice to
any state of affairs without holding someone accountable: "A bare fact, or a state
of affairs which nobody can change, may be good or bad, but not just or
unjust." 20 Accordingly,
Justice... does [not] aim at bringing about a particular state of affairs which
is regarded as just. It is not concerned with the results that a particular action
will in fact bring about. The observation of a rule of just conduct will often
have unintended consequences which, if they are deliberately brought about,
would be regarded as unjust. And the preservation of a spontaneous order
often requires
2 1 changes which would be unjust if they were determined by
human will.

In Hayek's view, the idea of justice does not apply to any spontaneous
order essentially because no one person can control the actions of the many who

contribute to that order:
In a spontaneous order the position of each individual is the resultant of the
actions of many other individuals, and nobody has the responsibility or the
power to assure that these separate actions of many will produce a particular
result for a certain person. Though his position may be affected by the
conduct of some other person or of the concerted actions of several, it will
rarely be dependent on them alone. There can, therefore, in a spontaneous
order, be no rules which will determine what anyone's position ought to be.

As Professor Bastress pointed out to me, the common law baseline also entails a set of choice by
policymakers that provoke predictable consequences. The order is "spontaneous" only in the sense
16

that a particular consequence is not dictated, as opposed to merely facilitated.
17ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1776).
18Ronald H. Coase, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel, Prize Lecture: The Institutional Structure of Production (December 9, 1991),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/I 991/coase-lecture.html
19FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 31 (1976).
2
0

id.

" Id. at 39.
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Rules of individual conduct, as we have seen, determine certain abstract
22
properties of the resulting order, but not its particular, concrete content.
By identifying the free market as a spontaneous order, Hayek commits us to
the conclusion that free market allocations are neither just nor unjust:
Since only situations which have been created by human will can be called
just or unjust, the particulars of a spontaneous order cannot be just or unjust:
if it is not the intended or foreseen result of somebody's action
that A should
23
have much and B little, this cannot be called just or unjust.
This does not mean that market actors cannot behave justly or unjustly. In
Hayek's view, although government cannot interfere with the results of market
allocation without interfering with individual autonomy, formal justice demands
that government regulate, via the rule of law, behavior necessary to maintain the
integrity of the free market process.24 For Hayek, then, government is justified in
interfering25with market affairs to regulate conduct against "fraud, monopoly, and
violence.,
4. Efficiency
Economists use several definitions of efficiency. As applied to labor and
employment law, at least four definitions are significant: production efficiency,
allocative or Pareto efficiency, Pareto superiority, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
At the most basic level, laypeople think of efficiency as how quickly a
worker can produce something. Economists have a definition for this commonsense conception of efficiency: "[a] production process is said to be productively
efficient if either of two conditions holds: (1) it is not possible to produce the
same amount of output using a lower-cost combination of inputs, or (226 it is not
possible to produce more output using the same combination of inputs.
Economists also refer to allocative or Pareto efficiency, meaning the
satisfaction of individual preferences. A situation is allocatively or Pareto
efficient "if it is impossible to change it so as to make at least one person better
off (in his estimation) without making another person worse off (again, in his
estimation). 27 Allocative efficiency is really a description of the bargaining
process. Ronald Coase recognized this in formulating his famous theorem 2F
"Given traditional assumptions of substantial knowledge, perfect rationality and

22 Id.
23
24

Id.at 33.
By rule of law Hayek "means that a government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and

announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on
the basis of this knowledge." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (1944).
25 HAYEK, supra note 19, at 73.
26
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 16 (4th ed. 2004).
27
1d. at 16-17.
28 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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the absence of both transaction costs and income effects, the assignment of legal
entitlements in cases of two-party incompatible [property] uses will be neutral as
to the goal of allocative efficiency." 9 Or more simplistically: "When
transaction costs are zero, an efficient use of resources results from private
bargaining, regardless of the legal assignment of property rights."3 °
Unlike Pareto conceptions of efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency "requires,
not that no one be made worse off by the move, but only that the increase in
value be sufficiently large that the losers could be fully compensated.",31 KaldorHicks efficiency assumes a corrective conception of justice; contractual breaches
are permissible and even encouraged if, after compensating the non-breaching
party, the breaching party still profits from the breach.32
Applying the Kaldor-Hicks conception of efficiency to the workplace, labor
standards (contractual, statutory, or regulatory) lower efficiency because the
greater the employees' expectancy, the more costly the employer's breach of the
employment contract. The lower the labor standards, the easier-more
efficient-it becomes for the employer to breach the employment relationship.
Under the lowest standard, employment at-will, the employer may breach the
contract of employment for any reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason at all.33
The Chicago School's emphasis on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency lends support for
this background rule of law. As Professor Richard Epstein explained, "freedom34
of contract tends ... to promote the efficient operation of the labor market."
Given both the normative argument that employment at-will promotes individual
autonomy and the economic argument that it promotes the efficient operation of
labor markets, employment at-will, argues Epstein, should be the default position
in the event of contractual silence.3 5 Accordingly, any contractual, statutory or
regulatory restraint on freedom of contract interferes with the Kaldor-Hicks
efficient operation of the labor market.

29 JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 69 (1988) (rearticulating Coase Theorem).
30

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 26, at 89.

31 Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 491 (1980); see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE

91 (1983) (citing Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939)); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic
Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1020 (1978) ("all and only those changes in legal relations
from which gainers would gain so much that they could fully compensate losers and still have some
gains left over") (interpreting Posner).
32 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 26, at 48.

33 Hutton v. Watters,179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915); Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-

19 (1884), overruled on othergrounds.

34 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. Cmn. L. REv. 947, 951 (1984); see
also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 20-77 (1992).
35 Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, supra note 34, at 951.
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5. Rational-choice Theory, Wealth Maximization, and Efficiency
Many free market advocates assume that market actors make rational
choices. Under rational choice theory, economic actors are assumed to maximize
what a rational actor in those circumstances would want.36 For example, firms
might maximize profits and workers might maximize wages.37 Nowhere in
Hayek's seminal work, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, does he specifically
identify or defend wealth maximization as an important society goal.'8 Rather,
welfare maximization as a rational social goal is more closely associated with the
Chicago School of Law and Economics with efficiency being the means toward
that goal.39
Judge Richard A. Posner, perhaps the most prolific spokesperson for the
Chicago School, justifies wealth maximization under a Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency
standard, arguing that maximizing wealth is the only rational preference that
carries ethical weight. 40 He begins with the idea that "the concept of the wealth
of society as the sum of all goods and services in the society weighted by their
values" derives from the concept of value in exchange. 4 1 Borrowing Adam
Smith's conception of the term "value as measured or at least measurable in a
market," Posner remarked:
The market price of a good is its value to the marginal purchaser, and
intramarginal purchasers will value it more in the sense that they would pay
more for it if the price were higher. The wealth of society includes not only
the market value in the sense of price times quantity of all goods and services
produced in it, but also the total consumer and producer surplus generated by
those goods and services.42
Thus, for Posner, the value of a good is based on the willingness and the
ability to pay for the thing desired: "The individual who would like very much to
have some good but is unwilling or unable to pay anything for it-perhaps
because he is destitute--does not value the good in the sense in which [he is]
using the term 'value."' 43 The only preferences that have "ethical weight in a
system of wealth maximization" are those preferences which "are backed up by
money, that is, that are registered in a market." 44 For Posner, the "wealth of
society is the aggregate satisfaction of those preferences."4 5

36

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 26,

37COOTER & ULEN, supra note
38

at 15
26, at 15-16.

See HAYEK, supra note 19.
POSNER, EcoNoMics OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 60-76.
40 id.
41
Id.at 60.
42 Id.
39

43

Id. at61.
4id.

45Id.
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C. Some Macroeconomic and Social Implications of the Free Market Labor
Model
1. Wealth Distribution: Minimal State Aid to the Unemployed Poor
Hayek reluctantly accepts that social security relief for the "needy" in
western societies will inevitably rise above the subsistence level. 46 Hayek
therefore does not address the question whether there should be a social security
policy in place for the unemployed who, like all people, require basic necessities.
He instead addresses the question "how and by whom any further assistance
based on their normal earnings should be provided for them, if at all, and, in
particular, whether this need justifies a coercive redistribution of income
according to some principle of justice. ' 47 Hayek concludes that the state should
provide a uniform minimum only to those unemployed individuals who are
"unable to maintain themselves. ' 48V Accordingly, Hayek adheres to an absolutist
definition of poverty and need: "Absolute poverty, sometimes called subsistence
poverty, is the idea that being in poverty is being without the minimum necessary
requirements for life or subsistence within life.'
Rather than redistributing wealth to the "needy," Hayek's preferred solution
to unemployment and poverty is to pursue economic and monetary policies to
reduce cyclical unemployment. 50 By contrast, social security policies-such as a
compulsory scheme of unemployment insurance or granting union demands for
higher wages (either by bargaining or legislating a minimum wage)-are, for
Hayek, cures worse than the disease. 51 As Hayek explained, such policies are
"irreconcilable with a high level of employment. It is therefore likely in the long
run to aggravate the evil it is meant to cure. 52
Because Hayek views social security as employee claim-rights enforceable
against the state, he says nothing about employer obligations to former
employees, such as employer contributions to employment insurance pools. But
adherents to a Kaldor-Hicks view would frown upon such employer obligations
because they tend to increase the social cost of labor and therefore raise the price
of compensating the loser-the terminated worker.

46 HAYEK, supra note 11, at 285.
47 Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
41
Id. at 302.
49
PETE ALCOCK, POVERTY AND STATE SUPPORT 3 (1987); see also PETER TOWNSEND, POVERTY IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM: A SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES AND STANDARDS OF LIVING 33
(1983) (citing B. SEEBOIM ROWNTREE, POVERTY: A STUDY OF TOwN LIFE (1901) (defining families
whose "total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of
merely physical efficiency as being in primary poverty"); CHARLES BOOTH, LIFE AND LABOUR OF
THE PEOPLE IN LONDON (1889)).

50 HAYEK, supra note 11, at 302.
51 Id.

52 Id.; F.A. HAYEK, 1980s UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE UNIONS (2d ed. 1984).
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2. Monetarism and its Relationship to Unemployment
Some economists, such as 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize winner, Milton
Friedman, argue that all unemployment is either frictional5 3 or voluntary. Most,
in Friedman's view, is voluntary.54 Under that view, government's role in
combating unemployment is to limit frictional unemployment by ensuring the
smooth operation of the free market and to discourage voluntary
unemployment. 55 For Friedman, any additional government regulation interferes
with the natural rate of unemployment and causes stagflation-high
unemployment coupled with high inflation. 6
Friedman bases his argument on a modified Phillips Curve, an equation that
describes the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. 57 In Friedman's
view, government can and should regulate the business cycle through moneta 7
policy, thereby diminishing the effects of the Phillips Curve trade-off
Government attempts to lower unemployment below this natural rate "by
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy" might temporarily reduce
unemployment rates but in the long-run would give rise to ever-accelerating
inflation. 59 The only way to reduce this natural rate is to reduce frictional
unemployment by freeing labor markets.
This argument has important consequences for post-termination
employment policies. Even if there is some cyclical fluctuation that leads to
involuntary unemployment, successful monetary policies can dampen
fluctuations to such a degree that any remaining unemployment would be either
frictional or voluntary. To combat frictional unemployment, government has a
limited role. First, the government must fight with unions, which collectively
aggravate frictional unemployment
by causing
upward pressure on wages, and
...
60
thereby contributing to a wage-price spiral. Second, government has the power
both to lessen or eliminate government regulations (which only make it more
expensive to do business and thus contribute to frictional unemployment) and to
promote free trade. To combat voluntary unemployment, the government's role

53 Frictional unemployment is simply the "[u]nemployment that is always present in the economy,

resulting from temporary transitions made by workers and employers or from workers and
employers
having
inconsistent
or
incomplete
information."
Investopia,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/frictionalunemployment.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
54 MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONETARIST ECONOMICS
55 Id.
56 Id.

(1991).

" A.W. Phillips, The RelationshipBetween Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage
Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957, ECONOMICA, Nov. 1958, at 283, 285, 290, 295-99 (1958).
58 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 54.
59 Alan Walters, Introductionto FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at viii.
60 The wage-price spiral is the theory that inflationary wages cause firms to increase prices, which
in turn leads to increased pressure for higher wages, thereby perpetuating a wage-price upward
spiral.
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is to discipline the labor market.6' It is here that some monetarists reintroduce
the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, a concept that has its
roots in the Elizabethan poor laws, by promoting the value of individual
responsibility. 62 Unemployment generally is viewed in the same light as fraudit is caused by unjust human behavior that harms the efficiency, and thus the
integrity, of the market. Government regulation of the behavior-as opposed to
the labor market-is therefore justified.
3. Morality: Fixating on Conduct
a. Overview
Unemployment is the flip side of the labor-market.
Examining
unemployment and free market solutions to unemployment is a good way to
distill some of the more overtly moralistic free market values. Because advanced
capitalist states, such as the United States, provide fairly advanced welfare
services, I turn to critics of the welfare state to distill those values. Charles
Murray, in his influential book, Losing Ground,63 sets forth several criticisms of
the U.S. welfare state. While the policies associated with such criticisms would
tend to focus on limited state intervention or a minimal welfare state,64 the values
behind those policies reveal a deeply rooted moral conception about how people
should behave-behavior that has its roots in an Elizabethan distinction between
the deserving and undeserving poor.
b. Establishing Moral Worth: Distinguishing Between the Deserving and
Undeserving Poor
For Murray, helping those in need is a moral imperative. 6' At least one
purpose of a welfare state-charity-appears well-suited to his purposes. Yet
Murray argues against a well-developed welfare state, arguing that such a state

61 Disciplinein the

Workplace, 254 EUR. INDUS. REL. REv. 14, 14 (1995) ("Increased unemployment

...has allowed employers to tighten up on discipline in the workplace").
62 Anne Marie Lofaso, British and American Legal Responses to the Problem of Collective
Redundancies (July 1996) (unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with
author).
63 Charles A. Murray, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984).
64 In fact, Murray supports eliminating the welfare state. In his view,

[S]crapping the entire federal welfare and income-support structure for working-aged
persons, including AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Worker's
Compensation, subsidized housing, disability insurance, and the rest ... would leave the
working-aged person with no recourse whatsoever except the job market, family
members, friends, and public or private locally funded services.
Id. at 227-28. That solution, he posits, would "convert a large proportion of the younger generation
of hardcore unemployed into steady workers making a living wage;" and "would drastically reduce
births to single teenage girls." Id. at 227.
65
Id. at 197.
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aims too broadly by failing to distinguish between the deserving poor, such as the
widowed mother, and the undeserving poor, lazy but otherwise healthy
individuals who refuse to work.66
Murray asks the ultimate question: why give at all? -If all social policy is
merely a "transfer[] from the haves to the have-nots, the proper first question is,
'What is the justification for any transfers at all?' Why should one person give
67
anything to a stranger whose only claim to his help is a common citizenship?
Murray's answer: we give out of compassion. Murray suIFests, however, that
To illustrate this
some are more deserving of our compassion than others.
point, Murray distinguishes between "a man who has worked steadily for many
years and, in his fifties, is thrown out of his job because the factory closes" and a
"second man, healthy and in the prime of life, [who] refuses to work., 69 In that
context, Murray asks why we should transfer money to each of them. For
Murray, we give to the first man because that "worker has plugged along as best
he could, contributed his bit to the community, and now faces personal disaster.
He is one of [our] fellows in a very meaningful way-'There but for the grace of
By contrast, Murray ponders that perhaps we should "let [the
God. . . .
second man] starve, considering it a form of suicide."' The purpose of the
welfare state then is not to redistribute wealth but to target our charity to the
morally worthy.
"'

c. Welfare Programs Eroded the Work Ethic by
Creating Disincentives to Work
Murray values the work ethic and believes that most welfare programs,
including unemployment insurance, erode that ethic.72 Using the U.S. negative
income tax program (NIT)73 as a case study, Murray posited that male recipients
of such tax credits lowered their desired hours of work ("measured .by actual
employment after factoring involuntary work reductions out of the calculation")
by nine percent, and female recipients lowered their desired hours of work by
twenty percent.74 In Murray's view, the reduction "consisted primarily of men
who opted out of the labor market altogether," rather than of men who had given

66Id. at 17, 22-23, 45.
67 Id.
68

at 197.
Id. at 197.
69 Id.
70 Id.

71id.
72 Id. at 154-66.
73 A "negative income tax provides payments to persons whose income falls below a certain floor."

Id. at 149.
74 Id. at 151 (interpreting data compiled by others who reported on the NIT experiment) (citing
Robert A. Moffit, The Negative Income Tax: Would it Discourage Work? 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV.

23-37 (April 1981)); Philip K. Robins & Richard W. West, Labor Supply Responses Over Time, 15
J. HUM. REsOURCES 524 (1980).
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up some overtime opportunities. 7
Murray considered these results to be
"disappointing but not the most troubling." 7 Instead, the results of wives and
young males not yet heads of families (characterized by Murray as those "who
were in a position to cause the most long-term damage
to the goal of reducing
78
poverty" 77) "showed the largest negative effects.,
Murray's interpretation of the U.S. NIT experiment reveals certain values
associated with a socially conservative brand of free market thinking. If welfare
causes the greatest erosion of the work ethic among female recipients, many of
whom would also be mothers, then the policy goal seems obvious. Create
incentives for women to stay home to take care of children by forcing parents,
generally mothers, to make a choice between working outside the home for
wages or taking care of their children. This creates at least two beneficial effects
in the social conservative's view. First, it reduces unemployment, defined as
those willing but unable to find a job, by opening up jobs that might have gone to
working mothers. Second, it facilitates the employers' ability to control the
supply of labor by maintaining peripheral workforces comprised primarily of
women and other disempowered workers.
d. Means-Testing Destroys the Dignity and Status of Working
In Murray's view, social security should be limited to some small class of
the deserving poor-those who cannot work because of disability, old age, or
infirmity. For Murray,
The exclusion of working people (no matter how small their incomes) was
not accidental.... A citizen in good standing was self-supporting. To have a
job was ipso facto to be self-supporting. If the income from that job was less
than one liked, it was up to the job-holder to do something about it....
Politically, it did not visibly occur to leaders of either major party prior to
1964 that people who had jobs ought to get welfare assistance.79
Murray criticizes social security policies that include working people.
Murray ties his critique to data showing that labor force participation rates
decreased after the introduction of welfare benefits to the working poor.
Interpreting that data, Murray concludes that means-tested benefits for working
individuals destroyed the distinction between the vagrant or undeserving poor
and the deserving poor.80 That distinction, in Murray's view, had been useful in
fostering an escape-from-poverty attitude among the poor.8' Destroying that
distinction by using means-testing destroyed the status of work. In Murray's

75MURRAy, supra note 63, at 151 (citing Robins & West, supra note 74, at 524).
76 Id.
77Id.
78 id.
79

1d. at45.

'oId. at 184-86.
81 Id.
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view, "[t]he hardcore unemployed were not people who were being rebuffed by
job interviewers, but
8 2 people who had given up hope or ambition of becoming part
of the labor force."
e. Individual Responsibility Breaks Co-Dependence and Structural Poverty
Murray asserts that the original "consensus about no welfare for working
people rested on a fragile assumption: that adults are responsible for the state in
which they find themselves. It was fragile because most people had recognized
for years that the assumption, strictly speaking, was not true. One's inheritance
mattered. Circumstances mattered. Luck mattered." 83 In Murray's view, once
this assumption deteriorated, policy-makers replaced it with another false
assumption that the system must be responsible for the state in which individuals
find themselves. This faulty assumption leads, in Murray's view, to the
development of a more intrusive welfare state, which itself was pivotal in
creating the structural poverty that it was meant to solve. To support that
conclusion, Murray showed that increased gross national product and increased
public expenditure on social security coincided with increased poverty. Given
that GNP, the most widely used measure for a nation's economic health, should
have an inverse relationship with poverty, Murray asked the question why
poverty increased during the 1970s (as compared with the 1950s), despite
increased GNP. Murray blamed the welfare system, which, in his view, created
dependency and work disincentives, thereby creating the very structural poverty
it aimed to eliminate.8 Murray explained: "[E]conomic growth in the 1970s lost
its power to reduce poverty [because] ... many of the poor were without jobs. If
one has no
85 job, it makes no difference how much the economy grows. Poverty
remains.
Murray's analysis led him inevitably to favor a minimal welfare state where
the government's role is primarily to provide incentives for promoting individual
"economic independence-standing on one's own abilities and accomplishments
.... ,86 His recommendation to eliminate the welfare state all together is based
on three premises: 87
1. People respond to incentives and disincentives. Sticks and carrots work.
2. People are not inherently hard working or moral. In the absence of
countervailing influences, people will avoid work and be amoral.

12
83

Id. at 75-76.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 59.
"6 Id. at 69.
Id. at 65.
87 Id. at 227-28.
'4
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3. People must be held responsible for their actions. Whether they are
responsible in some ultimate _philosophical or biochemical sense cannot be the
issue if society is to function."
D. Policies Generated by the Free Market Model
The free market model concludes that governments may interfere in the
market only to regulate unjust conduct or to facilitate the operation of the
market.8 9 Governments may not interfere to regulate outcome-not even
outcomes that would universally be deemed unjust had there been an actual
causal actor. 90 Applying a free market model to the workplace, the employment
relationship would be a purely voluntary relationship between the employer and
the employee free from the coercion of outside parties. Labor market policies
under the free market model can be broken down into four categories:
(1) individual labor market; (2) management prerogatives; (3) numerical
flexibility and the dual labor market; and (4) worker responsibility and a minimal
welfare state.
1. The Individual Labor Market
For Hayek, although most institutions are potentially coercive sources of
power, "[t]he individual provider of employment cannot normally exercise
coercion ....,,9 Hayek concedes that during high periods of unemployment,
monopoly employers may "[create] opportunity for true coercion ....But such
conditions, though not impossible [in a capitalist society], would, at the worst, be
rare exceptions in a prosperous competitive society., 92 By contrast, "[a]
complete monopoly of employment, such as would exist in a fully socialist state
in which the government was the only employer and the owner of all the
instruments of production, would possess unlimited powers of coercion. 93
But Hayek does not view businesses, in their role as employers, as potential
monopolists except in the socialist state. For Hayek, employers in a capitalist
economy, with or without perfect competition, are the least coercive source of
power, and the free market is the least coercive and most efficient method for
ordering the economy. 94 Accordingly, for Hayek, the state's role inregulating
business should be limited.95
Hayek also emphasizes the potential danger for coercion by unions-or
labor monopolies. Hayek views British unions as having acquired legal

" Id.at 146.
89 These conclusions summarize the free market position.
accompanying text.
9 Id..

91HAYEK,supra note 11, at 136.
92 Id.at 136-37.
93

Id.at 137.

94F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, 65-97 (1976).
95

HAYEK, supranote I1, at 136.

See supra notes 14, 19-25 and
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privileges or immunities permitting them to engage in monopolistic conduct.96
He similarly views American unions as monopolistic and privileged by their
exemptions from American anti-trust legislation. The privileged legal status of
British and American unions, in Hayek's view, gives them the power to coerce
fellow employees and employers by exerting unlimited pressure on them in
several ways.98 Initially, unions disrupt freedom of contract, by coercing
individuals to join their ranks, thereby denying individuals their right to bargain
freely and individually for terms and conditions of employment. Next, unions
encroach upon the employers' autonomy by impinging on their liberty to bargain
with and dismiss unilaterally individual employees. Then, unions disrupt the
spontaneous working order of the free market. In particular, the collective nature
of unions empowers them to fix wages at a level higher than would be dictated
by the free market. Applying free market principles, inflationary wages lead
inevitably to unemployment, through the wage-price spiral.99
Armed with these harms associated with a collective labor market, Hayek
concludes that the state should not adopt policies that privilege unions, but
instead adopt policies that promote an individual labor market that encourages
freedom of contract.'00
2. Management Sovereignty and Prerogatives: Employment At-Will
Hayek's theory also answers the question who should decide questions
involving workplace decisions, ranging from assigning work to hiring, firing, or
promoting employees. Here, Hayek emphasizes business autonomy, building on
a unitarist theory of industrial relations, common law employment at-will
doctrine, and the British company law tradition.' 0 ' Together, these traditions
form the basis for the doctrine10of
2 management preroragatives-a doctrine shared
by the American legal culture.
Under a unitarist system of industrial relations, management is "a final
authority whose decisions are definitive.' 0 3 The common law supports this
system by granting employers and employees the freedom to terminate the
employment relationship at any time for any reason-even a bad reason. °4 If
employers are in a stronger position than individual employees, which they

96

Idat 267.

9'ld.at 268; see also HAYEK, 1980s UNEMPLOYMENT AND
98 HAYEK, supra note 11, at 269-70.

THE UNIONS,

supra note 52.

99Id.at 271; see also Wedderburn, supra note 10, at 10-12.
1oo
HAYEK, supra note 11, at 267-84.
101
HAYEK, supra note 11, at 118-30.
102For example, "management prerogatives" is the keystone for the American employment at-will
doctrine. And it is the basis of many significant labor law doctrines. See, e.g., Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (decision to go out of business is
managerial decision immune from NLRA liability).
103H.A. Clegg, Pluralism in IndustrialRelations, 13 Br. J. OF INDUS. REL. 309, 309 (1975).
104See Hutton v. Watters,179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915); Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507,
518-19 (1884), overruledon other grounds;supra note 34, and accompanying text.
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typically are, then the capacity to terminate at will strengthens the employer's
power within that relationship. British and American corporate law, which are
"largely based on the concept of ownership" further reinforce the unitarist
system. 10 5 "The ultimate control of the company is seen in law as residing with
its owners or shareholders," whose interests management represents. 1°6 Sharing
such control with workers is antithetical to that system.
Underlying corporate sovereignty is the doctrine of management
prerogatives, whereby management has the exclusive right to make decisions
affecting the control of the company's affairs, including the unilateral right to
hire or terminate workers and to effectuate other policies regarding wages, job
security, or other terms and conditions of employment. 07 Under this doctrine,
the law carves out spheres of influence for shareholders, managers, and labor.
Under the primary sphere, shareholders cannot delegate decision-making power
to anyone, even their managers. 10 8 The secondary sphere is delegable to
management. 0 9 In practice these spheres are often coextensive because
shareholders are insufficiently organized to exert power over their agents and
therefore defer to the recommendations of management and the board of
directors. 10° Labor, by contrast, has no legal influence over the primary and
secondary spheres. Rather, labor's power to influence employer decision-making
is relegated to the tertiary sphere, which typically includes the terms and
conditions of employment. The extent of labor's influence over this sphere
depends on its bargaining power."''
3. Numerical Flexibility and the Dual Labor Market
Inextricably interwoven to the concept of management prerogatives is that
of flexibility. In particular, management is interested in numerical flexibility as a
means of achieving some control over the labor supply. This interest, coupled
with the structure of some modem companies, has, in some instances, created a
"dual labor market" that is segmented into a primary or core sector and a
secondary or peripheral sector. Core workers tend to have job security, internal
promotional opportunities, and higher wages. By contrast, peripheral workers,

105 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY,

Cmnd. 6706 (1977),

2,

at 59 (hereinafter "BULLOCK REPORT").
106id.

Lofaso, supra note 63, at 32.
108
BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 105, 18, at 77-78.
107

"'OId. 18, at 78.
"o Id. 2, at 59.
il1For an excellent discussion giving reasons why managerial discretion, rather than unionnegotiated agreements, has emerged as the dominant form of workplace governance, see Jeffrey M.
Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsh, The Rise & Fall of PrivateSector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?,
Sept. 26, 2006, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid--933493.
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comprised primarily of part-timers and other atypical workers, tend to have little
job security, little training, poor promotional opportunities, and lower wages.ll2
To effectively control labor supply through flexibility policies, it is
necessary to terminate some part of the work force at a low cost to the employer.
Policies that exclude atypical workers from pre- and post-termination rights tend
to augment numerical flexibility. By contrast, policies such as social security,
unemployment insurance, benefits vesting, and even general job training, are
costly measures for employers, especially for atypical workers."
4. Worker Responsibilities Linked to Autonomy: A Minimalist Welfare
State
For Hayek, the price of freedom is responsibility." 14 A successful
individual is one who takes advantage of the opportunities afforded by personal
freedom, develops personal calacity and then puts the potential to those uses
valued in a capitalist society. " A successful society will not reward the
brightest, that is, those possessing the most potential, but those who have realized
the greatest actualization of their potential: "It is of the essence of a free society
that a man's value and remuneration depend not on capacity in the abstract but on
success in turning
it into concrete service which is useful to others who can
6
reciprocate."l"
Accordingly, it is each worker's responsibility to create work opportunities
for his or herself. The value placed on individual responsibility tends to be
couched in terms of extolling the virtues of individual employment contracts,
which supposedly grant greater worker autonomy and freedom of choice than
collective agreements, which are viewed as resulting from union coercion of
fellow employees."'7
It is also the worker's responsibility to remain employed. Losing a job and
or the inability to get a job is viewed primarily as voluntary unemployment:
Even if the threat of starvation to me and perhaps to my family impels me to
accept a distasteful job at a very low wage, even if I am 'at the mercy' of the
only man willing to employ me, I am not coerced by him or anybody else.
So long as the act that has placed me in my predicament is not aimed at
making me do or not do specific things, so long as the intent of the act that

112

A.B.

ATKINSON,

THE ECONOMICS

OF INEQUALITY

146 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1983) (1975)

(citing P.B. DOERINGER & M.J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS

(1971)).
113 It is difficult to determine whether the free market model supports a policy of functional
flexibility-or cross-training workers for different jobs within the firm. Accordingly, a discussion
of this type of flexibility is developed infra.
114See HAYEK, supra note 11.
5
" Id. at.71-80.
Id. at 80-81.
117 See, e.g., DEPT. FOR EMPLOYMENT, PEOPLE, JOBS, & OPPORTUNITY, 1992, Cm. 1810 [hereinafter
PJO]; DEPT. FOR EMPLOYMENT, REFORM OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 1985, Cmnd. 9691.
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harms me is not to make me serve another person's ends, its effect on my
freedom is not different from that of any natural calamity ... .18
In these circumstances, the role of the state is to facilitate personal initiative
through policies promoting self-employment and self-improvement.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE FREE MARKET POSITION
A. Overview
This critique of the free market position takes three forms. First, I argue
that the economic values embodied in the free market are misplaced, in particular
challenging the primacy placed on efficiency (and secondarily on wealth
maximization) as the driving values underlying labor policy. I also question the
model's reliance on rational choice theory, arguing that where human conduct is
involved, choices are not always rational. Second, I challenge the claim that free
market labor policies in an advanced capitalist state are de-regulatory. I argue
that conservative policymakers use such language as a rhetorical tool to enhance
rights-based arguments that the free market allocates fairly by enhancing
individual autonomy. Third, I assess the types of harms generated by free market
policy choices. In particular, I examine various trade-offs between labor and
capital, including their sometimes irreconcilable property claims to the resources
they bring to the economy; their competing claims to autonomous decisionmaking; and their competing claims regarding the extent to which a society
should engage in wealth redistribution, and if so, who should make those
decisions and how.
B. Critique of Economic Values
1. Why Efficiency?
a. Confounding Conceptions
Arguments relying on principles of efficiency to promote the free market
tend to confuse three distinct conceptions of efficiency: allocative efficiency,
Kaldor-Hicks, and production efficiency. Whereas Hayek tended to value
allocative efficiency, American economists of law generally advance KaldorHicks efficiency made popular by the Chicago School. More recently, lawyers
on both sides of the Atlantic have looked at productivity to assess the efficiency
of labor standards in light of globalization and international economic
competitiveness.
Accordingly, those purporting to espouse a free market
resolution to a workplace issue can use whichever conception of efficiency that
suits their purposes.

18 HAYEK, supra note

11, at 137.
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b. Problems with Kaldor-Hicks
Under the guise of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, free market advocates often
push for lower labor standards. But such policies have little to do with
efficiency. Instead, by lowering labor costs-for example, by lowering wages,
diminishing benefits, or eroding workers' rights-employers have lowered the
threshold above which it becomes efficient to breach the employment
relationship. Thus, the amount to compensate the losers (the workers) is less
than in cases where workers have greater rights. Lowering labor standards
thereby allows otherwise less productive and less efficient employers, who treat
their workers poorly, to compete against those who have better working
conditions. For example, U.S. employers who illegally hire undocumented
immigrants are able to coerce those workers into accepting below-market pay
and substandard working conditions, thereby creating unfair competition with
those who hire documented workers." 9
This argument is also popular in literature about globalization. Employers
argue that lowering labor standards is necessary to compete internationally-a
global race to the bottom. But the veracity of that argument depends on many
variables, including the labor standards of other countries, the role capital plays
in those countries' economy, and the extent to which there is free trade among
the economies. Upholding transnational labor standards would go a long way
towards eliminating social dumping. This solution was devised long ago by the
original six member states of the European Union (formerly the Common
Market) in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which established the Common
Market's equal pay principle in response to France's complaint that its country's
better anti-discrimination laws gave unfair trade advantages to the other member
states.120

Kaldor-Hicks proponents also fail to account for the problems that lower
labor standards create. For example, lower health and safety standards in mines

1'9 See Brief for Employer Organizations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hoffman

Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 2001 WL 1631729, at *8-9 (arguing that "law-abiding
employers who honor labor and immigration laws" would be at a competitive disadvantage if the
NLRA exempts from backpay liability "scofflaw businesses" who hire undocumented workers).
The Supreme Court largely ignored this argument. See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
120Treaty of Rome art. 119, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
Social dumping is a practice involving the export of a good from a country with weak
or poorly enforced labour standards, where the exporter's costs are artificially lower
than its competitors in countries with higher standards, hence representing an unfair
advantage in international trade. It results from differences in direct and indirect
labour costs, which constitute a significant competitive advantage for enterprises in
one country, with possible negative consequences for social and labour standards in
other countries.
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Social Dumping,
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/
SOCIALDUMPING.htm (last visited October 16, 2007).
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create hazards that in turn compound inefficiencies. And even if, in the long run,
it is cheaper for mine owners to have low safety standards and to pay families for
resultant deaths and injuries, we must ask ourselves whether that is the type of
society we wish to live in. 2 '
c. Whose Efficiency Anyway?
Whatever definition of efficiency the business community uses, that
definition is always viewed from the employer's vantage point. Efficiency as
business efficiency collapses into a conception of that which benefits the society.
Under this view, general welfare is linked to efficient business management.
This model is problematic because it treats business efficiency as an end in
itself, thereby subordinating workers' individual rights to business ends. To be
sure, the model purports to treat the general welfare as an end. But the means by
which the general welfare can be maximized is by maximizing the efficiency of
business enterprises. The model thereby generates policies that maximize
business profits, as an end in itself, with all else subordinate to this end in the
name of the general welfare. Labor becomes one of many commodities parcel to
this trade-off. The model thereby disregards the human element of labor by
overlooking the fact that labor is not a commodity but a collection of individuals
who, as non-workers, possess certain civil, political, and socio-economic
rights. 122 In the name of the general welfare, the rights of workers-human
beings-are traded-off in favor of the rights of capital. By treating business
welfare as an end in itself and human labor as a commodity, the market model
collapses the community's interests with those of business and disregards the
significant differences between the interests of capital and labor in a marketdriven economy.
d. Manipulating Allocative Efficiency
Policies based on the Coase Theorem of allocative efficiency tend to
generate policies which favor bargaining. Nevertheless, many free market
advocates reject collective bargaining as an appropriate free market mechanism.
As discussed above, Hayek rejects unions and collective bargaining because, in

121 A

recent example is the Sago coal mine in West Virginia, where federal authorities had issued

twenty-one citations in 2005 for a build-up of combustible materials. On January 2, 2006, 12
miners were killed in a blast. Union representatives have complained that the fines are too small to
compel safety improvements. William McQuillen, Mine Where Explosion OccurredWas Citedfor
Hazards,
Jan.
4,
2006,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid= 10000087&sid=aAcRjFr7_TNs&refer=topworldnews.
The Sago tragedy precipitated both the federal and state governments to act. See Mine
Improvement and New Emergency Response Act, 30. U.S.C. §801 (2006) (amending Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977); West Virginia proposed regulations, available at
http://www.wvminesafety.org/PDFs/48-7mod.pdf.
122 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in SOCIOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS 73-74
(Greenwood Press 1973) (1964).
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his view, the union's collective nature is coercive and therefore harmful to
individual autonomy. Others economists object to unions on the theory that
unions create the wage-price-inflation spiral.
In place of collective bargaining, free market thinkers advance individual
bargaining as the more efficient bargaining mechanism. But there are several
problems with this approach-it neglects the basic assumptions of the Coase
Theorem; it is based on a simplistic view of the wage-price spiral; and it
promotes the "autonomy"23 rights of employers at the expense of fundamental
human rights of workers. 1
As a threshold matter, the preference for individual over' collective
bargaining neglects the basic assumption of the Coase Theorem: there must be
rough parity of bargaining power, as well as protection against theft, fraud, and
duress, for bargaining to be an efficient allocative mechanism. Otherwise, the
more powerful
party will be able to compel sale of the good or service in the
24
market. 1
More fundamentally, critics contend that unions price their members out of
jobs through the wage-price-inflation spiral. According to wage-price spiral
theory, unions contribute to rising wages above market price by monopolizing
the supply of labor: "[O]ne of the principal aims of a trade union will be to
maintain and if possible improve the wage position of its members .... The
power of the union to raise wages arises from the control that it can exercise over
the supply of labour.' ' 125 That argument is problematic, especially when applied
work, i.e, are
to circumstances where employers enjoy the right to subcontract
126
able to control labor supply though numerical flexibility.
By way of background, unions' power to raise wages above the market or
equilibrium price manifests itself by restricting either labor supply (e.g., through
strikes) or labor effort (e.g., through work stoppages). Historically, unions
restricted labor supply using a variety of means. Older craft unions, for example,
restricted entry into the profession through mandatory periods of apprenticeships;
closed shop policies limiting employer autonomy to hiring only union members;
some unions bargain for the right to restrict the total number employed and the
right to fill vacancies. Unions have also restricted "the supply of effort
(restrictions on output or on the allocation of labour) and the sanction of the

123 Hayek's attack on collective bargaining as being harmful to individual autonomy is discussed
infra Part III(D)(2)-(5).
24 To be sure, some individual workers have greatly enhanced bargaining power. This is most

typically seen in industries where the labor power is highly skilled-such as airplane pilots-and
even based on intangibles such as talent-baseball players. These markets in human labor power
are the exception.
125 ATKINSON, supra note 112, at 132 (citing L.C. HUNTER & D.J. ROBERTSON, ECONOMICS OF
WAGES AND LABOUR 275 (1969)).
126 See id. at 132-46; see also SIMON DEAKIN, JONATHAN MICHIE & FRANK WILKINSON, INFLATION,
EMPLOYMENT, WAGE BARGAINING AND THE LAW 6, 8 (1992) (criticizing HM Treasury, THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE UK, HMSO,
1985); Simon Deakin, Labor Law and IndustrialRelations, in ECONOMIC LEGACY 187 (Jonathan
Michie ed., 1992).
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withdrawal of labour through strikes, overtime bans, etc. To the extent that
unions can make use of such bargaining power, wages in the unionized sector are
higher.
,127 Policies restricting labor supply and labor effort enable unions to
make more effective use of their bargaining power to drive up wages.
From here, neo-classical economists make several arguments. Some argue
that a decrease in labor supply in the unionized sector, precipitated by unioncreated barriers to entry, leads to an increase in labor supply in the non-unionized
workforce, which, in turn, leads to wage depression in the non-unionized
sector. 28 Others claim that the initial rise in the price of union labor may attract
workers to union jobs thereby reducing labor supply in the non-unionized sector,
corresponding to increased wages in the union sector. 129 Either way, the main
effect of unionization is to increase wages, and thus increase unemployment and
eventually prices.
But as Oxford economist, Anthony Barnes Atkinson demonstrates, this
theory is simplistic because the income-distributional-consequences of
unionization depend on many factors other than the presence of unionization. As
an initial matter, the level of wages in the unionized sector "depends on the
relative bargaining strength of the two sides."'' 30 Only a relatively strong union
can demand and obtain high wages or create economic conditions that lead to
higher wages for union members. Correlatively, unions are at their weakest
during times of economic recession. So, when workers need their unions most is
when they are in their weakest bargaining position. Other significant factors
include the overall demand for labor, the elasticity of such demand, the degree of
wage standardization within an industry, 13 1 and "whether the relative gain of
union members is achieved at the expense of non-union labour or at the expense
of profits.' 3 2
Studies showing that unionization has some effect on wage differentials
prompted Atkinson to examine labor's demand-side. After reviewing the
economic literature, he found (predictably) a dual labor market, which is
segmented into a primary or core sector and a secondary or peripheral sector.
Core workers tend to have job security, promotion from within, and higher wages
whereas peripheral workers tend to have little
job security, little training, poor
133
promotional opportunities, and lower wages.
According to Atkinson, the "specific nature of skills and the importance of
on-the-job training [has] provide[d] a strong incentive for the employer to
develop internal labour markets with a low degree of turnover and internal
promotion." 134 Unionized workers similarly preferred this structure: "[W]orkers

127ATKINSON,

supra note 112, at 132.

128id.
129 Id.
30

Id. at 133.
Id. at 133-36
132Id. at 137.
'

'3'

133Id. at

146 (citing P.B.
ANALYSIS
1971)).
34
1 Id. at 141.
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gain from a structured long-run career within the enterprise with job security and
chances of advancement; and trade unions have a clear preference for the
resulting stability, often reinforcing it through rules such as seniority governing
promotion. ,0135
Employers have used the model of a segmented labor market in an overall
strategy to improve labor market flexibility to their advantage: "Increased
functional flexibility was sought from the 'core' workforce, while the
'peripheral' workforce was used to provide numerical flexibility, expanding and
contracting in size to meet fluctuations in demand.' 36 In this way, employers
could counteract the union's (real or perceived) ability to manipulate wages by
controlling labor supply and effort. To effectively control labor supply and
demand through functional and numerical flexibility, it is necessary to be able to
terminate some part of the workforce at a low cost to the employer and to crosstrain the more stable segment of the work force.
2. Critique of Wealth Maximization as a Goal
Wealth maximization presents several problems. As Oxford philosopher
and N.Y.U. Law professor Ronald Dworkin points out, wealth maximization is
inherently unstable and internally inconsistent. 137 In other words, wealth
maximization arbitrarily depends on the order of the transactions. Penn Law
professor C. Edwin Baker further develops this point. Baker explains that the
138
final distribution of wealth maximization policies depends on starting points.
Accordingly, the starting points themselves must be normatively grounded:
"Posner's inability to identify normatively appropriate starting points leaves him
unable to demonstrate that his wealth-maximization . . . criterion is either
appealing or workable.' 39
Wealth maximization simply is not intrinsically valuable to society. There
is no reason to suspect that a society in which property transfers are made on the
basis of willingness and ability to pay are, for that reason, superior societies.
Increases in wealth do not necessarily entail increases in happiness.' 40 Instead, a
society where increased wealth is the goal and which equates value with ability
to pay favors the desires of the richer members vis a vis those of the poorer

135 id.
136 Catherine Hakim, Core and Periphery in Employers' Workforce Strategies, 4
Soc'y 157, 164 (1990).
137 RONALD DWORKIN, MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

WORK,

EMP. &

238 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, MP]; Ronald

Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 192 (1980).
138 C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.939 (1980);
see also DWORKIN, MP, supra note 137, at 238-39.
139 Baker, supra note 138, at 948-53.
140As Dworkin explains, "[m]oney or its equivalent is useful so far as it enables someone to lead a
more valuable, successful, happier, or more moral life. Anyone who counts it for more than that is a
fetishist of little green paper." Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 137, at 201.
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members. Thus, increases in wealth, unless
41 "equitably distributed," are likely to
decrease the happiness of some members. 1
This is not to say that increased wealth is not sometimes of instrumental
value. For example, wealth can produce technological developments that may be
detrimental to some individuals in the short-run (e.g., technological
displacement), but might raise society's overall living standards in the long-run.
It cannot go unnoticed that citizens of western nations often experience higher
standards of living than citizens of developing nations. But to paraphrase
Dworkin, if we as a society take individual rights seriously, harms to
42
individuals--even in the name of the greater good-must be taken seriously.'
Our social goal then is not so much wealth maximization but the independent
goal which more wealth purportedly supports.
With respect to laws governing the workplace, the question becomes: what
independent goal or value is allegedly advanced by the policy of wealth
maximization? The focus of Sections V-VI is to examine those independent
values, specifically the rights to dignity (or equality of respect); autonomy as in
individual, intrinsic liberty as opposed to the instrumental view of autonomy set
forth by Hayek; industrial democracy; and social justice.
3. Critique of Rational Choice Theory
The free market model relies on the assumption that individuals make
rational choices. But where human conduct is involved choices are not always
rational. Rather, as Berkeley professors George Akerlof (2001 Nobel Prize
recipient) and Janet Yellen explain, individuals engage in "near-rational"
behavior or "behavior that is perhaps suboptimal but that nevertheless imposes
very small individual losses on its practitioners relative to the consequences of
their first-best policy.' ' 143 Thus, even near-rational behavior has very different
policy implications than rational behavior. In accepting his Nobel Prize for this
theory, Professor Akerlof observed that the behavioral assumptions of the free
market model were so "primitive" that it could not account for six
macroeconomic phenomena, including the existence of involuntary
unemployment and the persistence of a self-destructive underclass.'"
C. Deregulation or Re-regulation?
Market economies, such as the U.S. and the U.K., put in place deregulations
policies during the 1980s and 1990s. At least in Britain, policymakers overtly
applied Hayek's free market theory as a means of augmenting Hayekian

41DWORKIN, MP, supra note 137, at 244-49.

142 For additional

arguments, see id. at 240-41, 248-50.

143George A. Akerlof& Janet L. Yellen, A Near-RationalModel of the Business Cycle, with Wage

and PriceIntertia, 100 Q.J. ECON. 823, 825 (1985).
144George A. Akerlof, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel, Prize Lecture: Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior (December 8,
2001), http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economics/laureates/2001/ akerlof-lecture.pdf.
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autonomy, a negative liberty. Advocates of the deregulation have advanced two
claims-first, deregulation restores the free market; and second, deregulation
enhances important social goals other than wealth maximization. Both claims
fail.
Labor market deregulation policies have tended to weaken union power
(e.g., decollectivization of the labor market), promote employment both
numerical and functional flexibility (e.g., subcontracting and firm-specific crosstraining), and weaken state involvement in social security. Many of these
"deregulation" policies actually regulate the labor market by manipulating
starting points in favor of property owners. As Cambridge law professor Simon
Deakin and Cambridge economist Frank Wilkinson explain, "[d]eregulation
cannot be seen as a restoration of a 'free market' order.",
For example, it is
difficult to see how narrowing the definition of need for purposes of mean-tested
benefits restores the free order. I have argued that policies such as these are more
properly viewed as regulating conduct based on a Christian view of the deserving
poor than as restoring the free market. 46 This is significant because advocates of
deregulation policies argue that restoring the free market order is the most
efficient way to allocate resources and that labor standards tend to interfere with
both market efficiency and individual autonomy. By showing that deregulation
is not really a restoration of the free market order, the policy of deregulation
loses its economic and philosophical appeal.
Nor is it clear that these re-regulatory policies enhance important social
goals. Rather, as shown below, these policies harm values such as worker
autonomy, dignity, and industrial democracy. Furthermore, the redistributive
effects of deregulation "divert the costs of recession and 'economic
change on to
47
the least politically and economically entrenched groups."'
D. Harms Generated by Free Market Policies
1. Trade-off Between Employee and Employer Property Rights
The free market theory arrogates employer property rights (in land, capital,
and other business assets) above the rights of workers. The law has traditionally
viewed workers' labor power as a business asset, and hence part of employer
property rights. The law thereby protects employer property rights while denying
individuals ownership rights in their labor. To combat this imbalance in legal
protections, twentieth-century labor thinkers have explored the possibility of
granting to workers property rights in their labor. 148 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has even recognized a sort of quasi-property right that workers accumulate
through seniority. 49 This approach has its weaknesses. 150 In particular, while.
& FRANK WILKINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 34 (1991).
Lofaso, supra note 63, at 217-29, 280-81, 306-11.
147DEAKIN & WILKINSON, supra note 145, at 34.
148
See, e.g., Bob Hepple, A Right to Work?, 10 INDUS. L.J. 65, 69 (1981).
149 E.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (deviating from a seniority system to
145 SIMON DEAKIN
146

accommodate a worker with a disability would not be a "reasonable" accommodation); Trans
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there are many sources of property rights, most notably the common law and
state statutory law, judges have a great influence on how such rights should be
interpreted and developed. Therefore, defining one's labor as a property right
gives courts license to balance those various property rights against other
property rights. To the extent that judges are persuaded by free market
arguments, judges might be tempted to tip the balance in favor of more
traditional employer property rights.15 '
2. Harms to Personal Freedom
A deeper look at Hayek's focus on individuals taking whatever employment
the market dictates reveals a society that will permit the market to inflict
profound harms on individual liberty. By allowing the labor market to develop
the self through job selection, the result may be no better, from the worker's view
point, than Olga Korbet or Nadia Comenici developing their gymnastic skills
because the Soviet or Romanian government commanded them. In this manner,
it is essential to see the labor market as a coercive, rather than spontaneous,
order-an order that favors property owners over the property-less.
3. Weakening Employee Participation Rights
Hayek's applied free market state, and especially the doctrines of business
autonomy and management prerogatives, weaken industrial democracy. In a
Hayekian state, employment policies, for example, are determined by the
employer unless the parties freely contract to do otherwise. Whether by
employment at-will or by individual employment contract, the employee has
little control over the terms or conditions of hiring or dismissal because of the
employee's relatively weak bargaining position:
Hayek's [free market] State must be a strong and a vigilant State. It must
have a constitutional power to defend the natural order against not only
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79-80 (1977) (qualifying co-workers' seniority
rights would not be a reasonable accommodation of an employee's religion under Title VII);
Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 348-56 (1977); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1964)
(seniority rights are of "overriding importance" in the nation's economy); see also BARBARA
LINDEMAN & PAUL GROssMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW 51 (3d ed. 1996) ("The use
of seniority for the allocation of benefits in the workplace is deeply rooted in American industrial
relations"). As the Supreme Court recently noted in Barnett, "case law has recognized the
importance of seniority to employee-management relations .... [A] typical seniority system
provides important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair,
uniform
treatment.... 535 U.S. at 392.
5
o See infra Part IV(D) and accompanying text.
151A persuasive example of this prediction arises in the NLRA context, where for years courts have
promoted employer property rights at the expense of federally protected statutory rights to
organize. E.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (nonemployee union organizers may
not generally access employers' property to organize employees); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).(same). But, as Professor Bastress has pointed out to me in conversation,
a property right in labor cannot be worse than what nonstatutory job protection the worker now has.
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positive "coercive" planning or groups that endanger the market, but also
against the threat even of socialism-by-inadvertent-consent. Conceived as
libertarian, the doctrine ends by denying liberty to those who would change
of liberty" must deny liberty to
its economic doctrines. The "constitution
152
those who do not share his beliefs.
Underpinning management prerogatives are in-the-community's-bestinterests-arguments. But those analyses collapse the interests of shareholders and
other property owners with the interests of the community as a whole, while
neglecting the interests of labor all together. Even assuming that state officials
wish to serve their citizens' best interests by promoting business interests, any
trade-offs between rights and economic growth in Western capitalist societies are
"all too apt to be taken farther than is necessary to provide a material standard
adequate for a decent human life for all., 153 Economic growth becomes an end in
itself, rather than a means to promoting some more significant end, such as
happiness.
Furthermore, these analyses neglect the interests of workers. Broadly
speaking, workers are concerned with job security, wages, and the terms and
conditions of employment. Workers are interested in the economic well-being of
the company to the extent that economic growth signifies job security and higher
wages. Workers' interests in a company's financial health are therefore
instrumental, not intrinsic, to their own well-being. Consequently, the interests
of shareholders and other property owners often conflict with those of their
workers and those of the labor movement more broadly.
By asserting the rights of management to make unilateral hiring and firing
decisions, the free market denies employees participation in the decision-making
process. Recognizing that workers are less likely to accept this situation, some
employers have initiated employee participation schemes. But such schemes
tend to mimic participation through techniques desined to persuade employees
In the U.K., for example,
to accept decisions already made by management.'
such techniques include consultation arrangements, staff briefs, and information
dissemination meetings.1 55
4. Harms to Procedural and Substantive Rights of Individual Employees
Adverse employment actions, such as terminations, refusals to hire, and
promotional decisions can damage the morale of the affected employee.
Depending on how the employer handles the situation, the employee may feel
poorly treated or experience a loss of one source of personal fulfillment.
Although it is hard to imagine that any individual enjoys being fired or
overlooked for a promotion, an individual might at least take comfort in knowing

152

Wedderbum, supra note 10, at 14-15.

153
C.B. MACPHERSON, Problems of Human Rights in the Late Twentieth Century, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 21,29 (1985).
54
1 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

PJO, supra note 117, IT 5.1-. 12, at 40-44.

155

68-69 (1970).
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that the adverse employment action was economically motivated rather than
through some fault of their own. The existence of this potentially comforting
rationalization permits Oxford professor Hugh Collins to conclude that in "the
absence of any work to be done, or a pressing need to improve labour
productivity, to meet competitive pressures, the employer no more displays
disrespect to the dismissed workers than any person who chooses not to buy a
service because he or she cannot afford it." 156 Collins continues: "[d]isrespect to
the dismissed workers only arises where the employer fails to follow a fair
procedure or adopts suspect criteria for selection of those employees to be made
redundant."' 5 7 Collins' denial of dignity-harms associated with economically
motivated adverse employment decisions is based on two assumptions: first, the
right to decide who, when, and why to make an adverse employment action
resides with management. 5 8 Second, that a unilateral, but economically
motivated, decision is neutral so long as it is not personally motivated-not
directed at any particular worker.'59
Granting management unlimited prerogatives to take certain adverse
actions, such as job termination, is an affront to employee dignity, a denial of due
process, and neutral (nonpersonal) only from management's perspective.
Terminations decided unilaterally by management or executed in a manner that
disregards employee concerns tends to cause harms to dignity and personal
autonomy, the extent to which depending on the magnitude of the loss.
Under these circumstances, the free market fails to (1) treat "individuals as
persons of independent moral worth," 160 or (2) provide each person with
opportunities "to bring meaning to his or her life through work." 61 Hayek's
liberty theory may be couched in the rhetoric of individualism and personal
autonomy, but it necessarily subordinates the individual employee to the
instrumental ends of business owners and management.
Hayekian-brand
autonomy entails a negative conception of liberty-freedom from the coercive
powers of all institutions except the powers of business enterprise. Hayek's
theory does not possess a corresponding conception of positive liberty. For
Hayek, the employer-not the individual-is supreme; and thus, Hayekian free
market theory trades employee rights for employer autonomy.

156 HUGH
57
1 Id.
158

COLLINS, JUSTICE INDISMIssAL 153 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 1992).

By bracketing the question of "suspect criteria," Collins does cast some doubt on the

management prerogative to unilaterally decide who is affected by the adverse employment action.
Accordingly, in Collins view, management prerogatives should be limited at least by laws
prohibiting discrimination. Id.
159Id.
160 Id. at

16; see also DwORKN, MP, supra note 137, at 302.

161 COLLINS, supra note 156, at 16; see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-78

(1986).
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5. Trading-off Employees' Social and Economic Rights
By focusing on employer autonomy, the free market fails to safeguard the
socio-economic interests of employees. Again, it is Hayek's focus on negative,
rather than positive, autonomy that prevents Hayek from entertaining the idea of
a property right in employment. Moreover, it is Hayek's adamant adherence to
the supremacy of the business enterprise to the detriment of the individual that
prevents an analysis of the issues surrounding the social and economic equality
of individuals. This trade-off is also seen in the dynamic conception of need "the social construction [of which] . .. is a matter of ideology and political
,,1 62
interests ....
By drafting need in subsistence terms, free market advocates

combine the moral rhetoric of charity with a conservative economic ideology to
the detriment of the unemployed.
Having examined the free market model, which values negative autonomy,
formal justice, efficiency, wealth maximization, and a minimal social security
state, and having criticized the free market model, I now examine several
different values upon which a system of labor laws governing workers and the
unemployed could be built. I begin with a critical analysis of the property rights
model for grounding workers' rights.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT
A. Overview
By the early twentieth century, Yale Law professor Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld (1879-1918) had already recognized that "[t]he word 'property' .. .
ha[d] no definite or stable connotation."' 163 An historical analysis of those
changing conceptions of property reveals why, given our current legal system, a
property right in one's labor is doomed to fail-not help those workers it would
be designed to help.
B. The Changing Conceptions of Property
Until the seventeenth century, people used the term property in a relatively
broad sense to include the right to life, liberty, and a means of living.' 64 Within
this tradition of developmental individualism, philosophers saw human
essence
165
as "the active exertion and development of individual potentialities.',

162 JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY

3 (1991)

(citing M. EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE (1988)).
163 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21 (1913).
164 MACPHERSON, Human Rights as Property Rights, in THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE
AND OTHER PAPERS, supra note 153, at 76, 77.
165 MACPHERSON, Pluralism,Individualism and Participation,in THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC
JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS, supra note 153, at 92, 96.

UMKC LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

The market economy ushered in the rise of thinkers in the possessive
individualism tradition, who viewed humans as rational "maximizing
consumer[s] of utilities.' 66 The liberal democratic state's commitment to the
market economy and capital accumulation 167 coupled with the belief that humans
are rational maximizing consumers of utility, fostered a narrowing of the idea of
property rights. That narrowing, observed Canadian political theorist C.B.
Macpherson (1911-1987), came in four stages: (1) from individual property
rights in one's life, person, capacities, liberty plus material means of life to
individual property rights in material things; (2) from a right to exclude and not
to be excluded to merely a right to exclude; (3) a right to use and enjoy to a right
to buy and sell; and (4) a right in things and in revenues to merely a right in
things. 168
Professor Macpherson attributes the narrowing of the property conceptfrom a broad right enabling individuals to develop their potentials to "an
exclusive individual right to use and dispose of material things"1 69 -to the rise of
the capitalist market economy. With the market's rise in prominence, each
individual's personal development depended so much on the market that it
became natural to equate the broader concept of property with one's material
property. To the extent that the market was given the role of allocating economic
rewards, property rights became an important legal concept in protecting those
rewards. Judges responded by dropping any right within the proprietary bundle
that was not marketable, such as the right not to be excluded, in favor of
marketable rights, such as the right to exclude others. 70 The purpose of property
rights came to be three-fold: (1) to void alienation of the protected property right;
(2) to compensate for the forceful taking or economic diminution of that right;
and (3) to trigger the right of procedural due process prior to the taking of that
right.'
C. The Nature of the Property Right to Work
1. Overview
A property right to work could take on many forms, depending on the
breadth of the definition of property used. Below, I examine different forms of
property rights in labor that the law could protect, including the right to work, to

'66
Id. at 95-96.
167 MACPHERSON, Do We Need a Theory of the State?, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE
AND OTHER PAPERS, supra note 153, at 65.
168 MACPHERSON, Human Rights as Property Rights, supra note 153, at 80-81.
69

1 1 d. at78.

170 MACPHERSON, supra note 153, 76-81

171See COLLINS, supra note 156, at 89; Guido Calibresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1105-15
(1972); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335,
1336 (1986); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
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earn money by using one's labor, and to gain access to the means of labor. 172 I
examine the nature of each of these rights, against whom the right should be
asserted (state, employer, or worker), and remedies triggered by violation of
these rights (reinstatement, compensation for forceful taking or economic
diminution of the right, or due process). Where appropriate, I examine the
question whether the particular property right advanced comports with a free
market conception of property.
2. The Right to Work
A property right to work as a claim right' 7 3 against the state could take on
various forms depending on the circumstances. In cases where the employee
loses his or her job, the right could be relatively narrow-a claim against the
state for monetary compensation (with or without job training). A broader right
might oblige "the State to maintain a full employment policy, to protect the
opportunity of every worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered
upon, to establish and maintain free employment services for all workers, and to
provide and promote vocational training."'' 74 The property right to an actual
job-a claim right against the state to maintain full employment-corresponds to
the broadest conception of property as a right to life, person, capacities, and
liberty plus the material means of life. But whatever form is taken, enforcement
of a property right to work requires a well-developed welfare state, not the
minimal state that Hayek and other free market thinkers envision.
A property right to work that is enforceable against the employer may
comprise the right to be engaged, to be given work to do, to be "continuously
employed, including the right to be reinstated in the event of unjustified
termination,' 1 75 or to be compensated for termination. These rights all encroach
upon the management prerogative to refuse employment to anyone for any
reason-even a bad reason. In a union setting, it could
76 also mean a right to be
given bargaining unit work or to be given union jobs. 1
The right to be engaged promotes policies that spread employment over a
wide range of people and might include laws protecting individuals against
discrimination or seasonal workers in general.' 77 This conception of the right
might also generate workfare schemes or jobs projects. The right to be given
work comprises the right to be given work of a specific kind during working
hours. 7 8 This right might generate job training programs. The right to
continuous employment enforceable against the employer comprises the right to

172 MACPHERSON,

supra note 153, at 82-83.

173 Holding a claim right is simply to be owed a legal duty. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMBE
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING

Wheeler Cooke ed., Greenwood Press 1978) (1919).
174 Hepple, supra note 148, at 69.
171 Id. at 73.
176 See ATKINSON, supranote 112.
177 See Hepple, supra note 148, at 73-74.
178 See id. at 75.

(Walter
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reinstatement after unfair dismissal, 179 labor rights to codetermination over
dismissal decisions, and perhaps something akin to Germany's sozial plan.80
The right to compensation encompasses a social security system.
A property right to work, enforceable against collective labor, conflicts with
the union's right to a closed shop.' 8 ' This conception of a property right to work
generates the individual right to dissociate, as embodied in the Taft-Hartley
amendments of the NLRA.182
3. The Right to Earn Money from One's Labor
The right to earn money is most commonly conceived of as the right to sell
one's labor to buyer-employers and therefore is commonly thought of as a
property right enforceable against the employer. In its most extreme form, then,
this property right collapses into a right to be free and a prohibition against
slavery. But this right might also take the form of a right enforceable against the
state with the individual buying from the state the right to practice a certain skill
in the form of licenses, such as the license to practice law.
4. The Right to Access the Means of Labor
As a right enforceable against the state, the right to access the means of
labor can resemble a full employment policy. Such a broad conception of the
right to work is incompatible with the free market system. It could also simply
mean a barrier to entry into the workforce-no person may work without state
license. As enforceable against the employer, this right encompasses the right to
promotional opportunities, training, and job options. As a right enforceable
against collective labor, this right might resemble a right to be given work from
hiring halls regardless of union affiliation.

179 See id. at 76. I am contemplating here a right enforceable in a labor tribunal or other court of
law.
180 Historically, under German law, some companies have been required to negotiate a sozial plan

(or social plan) with works councils to minimize job loss in cases where the company is liquidating
or reorganizing. See, e.g., Everett M. Kassalow, Four nations' policies toward displaced steel
workers,
MONTHLY
LAB.
REv
(July
1985),
available
at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml 153/is n7_v108/ai_3836217.
181Id.; see generally SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF AssOCIATION (1992). A closed shop is a place
of business whose employees are required to be union members as a precondition for employment.
182 My views regarding right-to-work laws and their relationship to property rights in employment
are beyond the scope of this article. Let it suffice to say, for now, that right-to-work laws and
abolishing the closed shop protects the individual (property) rights of workers at the expense of
what each individual might gain through the collective. But I leave that argument, and illuminating
this conflict between the individual and the collective, for another time.
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5. The Right Not to be Excluded
Any of these conceptions of a property right to work might be conceived of
as a right not to be excluded. For example, a right to continuous employment
enforceable against the state might be conceived as a right not to be excluded
from access to society's accumulated means of labor. 83 A right to a particular
job can be thought of as a right not to be excluded from access to a particular
employer's means of labor.' 4 Or for a union member, it can mean a right not be
excluded from bargaining unit work and an employer obligation to refrain from
subcontracting that work. A right to income enforceable against the state might
be conceived as a right not to be excluded from access to opportunities in a
capitalist society, many of which depend on income.18 5
Unemployment policies generated from the right not to be excluded include
most policies that make it more expensive for employers to terminate workers,
and post-termination policies that aid the unemployed in finding alternative
means of employment suitable to their interest. Accordingly, such policies are
incompatible with the free market model because they are de facto Kaldor-Hicks
inefficient-they make it more expensive to breach the employment contract.
D. Property Rights Critique-A Case Study
In a capitalist economy governed by a state committed to promoting market
principles, there can be neither an absolute right to any particular job nor even a
right to work in general because, in the view of free market theorists, such a
strong conception of a property right in labor would halt the capitalist
economy
As explained above, market economists appeal to the principle of
general welfare maximization, assess policies in terms of their economic
efficiency (defined from the employer's vantage point), and conclude that job
ownership would be inefficient-a conclusion that begs the questions: whose
efficiency, and under which conception of efficiency?
But even less radical forms of labor ownership have proven difficult to
maintain in a market-driven state. A modem day labor example of this
phenomenon is witnessed in the constant struggle of union organizers to gain
access to employer property to organize employees or to engage in some other
form of concerted activity for the mutual aid or protection of fellow workers.
Over the past seventy-five years, the National Labor Relations Board, the federal
agency charged by Congress with the task of creating a uniform national labor
policy, has attempted to grant nonemployee union organizers access to the
workplace. The Supreme Court has twice struck down those attempts'8 7 thereby
greatly limiting the conditions under which nonemployee union organizers can

183 MACPHERSON,

supra note 153, at 82.

'm Hepple, supra note 148, at 73.

185

MACPHERSON,

supra note 153, at 82.

186 COLLINS, supra note 156, at 11, 143-53.

187 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956).
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access employer's property to communicate with employees about the benefits of
unionization to three main circumstances.
In a first group of cases, nonemployee union organizers can access
88
employer property where there are no alternative means of communication.'
Reviewing courts have characterized this application of the general rule as a
"narrow exception to an employers' property right to exclude others from its
property," which "applies where the employees 'are isolated from the ordinary
flow of information that characterizes our society,' such that 'the inaccessibility
of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to
communicate with them through the usual channels.""' 8 9 This limitedcommunication-exception has been recognized only a handful of times, and
generally in situations involving employees working (and living) in remote
locations, such as Alaskan mining campsites.' 90 It is hard to imagine this
exception broadening in a day where electronic devices make even the most
remote workplaces far more accessible.
In a second group of cases, "an employer may validly post his property
against nonemployee distribution of union literature if... the employer's notice
or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other
distribution."' 91 Reviewing courts have recognized this exception more often,
but on the whole, courts have predictably had trouble with the idea that
employers are not free to allow whomever they want on their property, and have
therefore permitted employers to post their property against nonemployee union
organizers even in the face of discrimination, essentially ignoring the doctrine. 92
As one court put it:
[S]olicitations for girl scout cookies, Christmas ornaments, hand-painted
bottles ... cannot, under any circumstances, be compared to union
solicitation as support for the ... determination that the restaurant engaged in
a discriminatory application of its non-solicitation policy. We are at a loss to
comprehend how a restaurant could maintain positive relations with its
employees and customers if it failed to allow an activity as innocent as the
sale of girl scout cookies or the sale of hand-blown Christmas ornaments
during the yuletide season . . . . [These] examples . . . can be seen as
beneficial to all employees, whereas the union solicitation by the three
disciplined employees obviously . . . made some of the employees
uncomfortable enough to complain to management. A restaurant in the

188 Lechmere,
89

502 U.S. at 534-35.

1 Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. v. NLRB, 190 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lechmere,

502 U.S. at 537, 540).
190 See id.; Husky Oil, N.P.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 643, 644, 647 (10th Cir. 1982)
(remote Alaska oil drilling camp-Camp Lonely-located only 75 miles south of the northern most
point in the US, with one public phone and reachable only by plane); NLRB v. S&H Grossinger's
Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 27-29 (2d Cir. 1967) (resort hotel in Catskill Mountains, where most employees
also lived on hotel premises with no telephones in their rooms); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber
Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 148-52 (6th Cir. 1948) (lumber camps).
191Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
192 See, e.g., 6 West Ltd. Corp. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2001).
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United States of America should be free to prohibit solicitations on the
premises that interfere with or bother employees or customers, and allow
those solicitations which neither interfere with nor bother employees or
customers. 193

The third group of cases is perhaps the most interesting from the standpoint
of the autonomous dignified worker. In those cases, the state has taken out of the
employer's property-rights-bundle the right to exclude. In cases where there is
no state right to exclude,' 94 the Babcock-Lechmere doctrine, which normally
allows state trespass laws to trump federally protected rights of employees to
receive information about unionization from nonemployees at the worksite,
simply does not apply.1 95 All that remains are the employees' right to receive
information regarding unionization from the nonemployees, a right protected by
federal legislation.' 9 Currently, only two states grant such rights. New Jersey
grants individuals the right to enter private property to gain access to employees
residing on that property.197 California also grants a more limited right.98 The
Supreme Court upheld California's authority to define property rights in this
manner, further holding that protecting speech and petitioning activity on
privately-owned shopping centers does not constitute a constitutionally
actionable taking under the Fifth Amendment. 99 Although reviewing courts
have had some trouble with the idea that the state can actually remove the right to

193

Id. (emphasis added). Cases like 6 West are necessarily premised on the bald assertion that

employers own their employees while they are engaged in doing their employer's business. See
generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006) (holding that "when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.").
194 Property rights stem from state, not federal law. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.
200, 217 n.21 (1994); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); UFCW Local
400 v. NLRB, 222 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that "whether an employer has a
sufficient property interest to exclude Union organizers is a question of state property law").
195 See Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB,
347 F.3d 1145, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2003).
196 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2007).
197 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
198 CA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1154-55; NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d
1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999);.see generally Jeffery M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights out of
FederalLabor Law, 47 B.C. L. REv. 891 (2006). Of course, this right-of-access doctrine is also
invoked where nonemployee union organizers seek access to the public spaces surrounding an
employer's private property. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 325 (1st Cir. 1990)
(employer unlawfully excluded nonemployee union organizers from public grassy strip adjacent to
privately owned parking lot), rev'don other grounds, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
199 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899, 910 (1979) (holding that the California
Constitution protects "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when
the centers are privately owned"), aftd, 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980).
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exclude from the bundle of property
rights, the California Supreme Court
20
recently reaffirmed this principle. P
E. Irreconcilable Conflicts Between the Rights of
Property Owners and Those of Workers in a Free Market State
The nature of a property right in employment is fragile under a narrow, free
market conception of property. Indeed, the laws of most market economies do
not recognize such a right in the abstract. 20 ' To be sure, some laws or policies
advancing less radical property rights, such as job security, seniority rights, or
severance pay, for example, can be viewed as applying the idea that a person has
some property right in his or her labor. These relatively recently won rights are
limited in scope, with the precise nature of what it means to have a property right
in labor not typically being defined by statute or common law.
By reverting to a broader conception of property, a fuller property right in
one's labor is attainable. And for some time, progressive thinkers have attempted
to solve labor market failures by advancing the position that the law should
recognize a property right in one's labor. 202 But as the Babcock-Lechmere
analysis makes plain by way of example, courts, whose judges are after all more
likely to be members of the class of property owners, will be reluctant to enforce
rights that transgress the "property rights" of "property owners," as defined by
pre-existing law.
V. THE LAW'S ROLE IN PROMOTING WORKER AUTONOMY
A. Overview
The conflict between the property rights of capital and those of labor in
market economies signals an incompatibility between the current capitalist
conception of property rights and the human right to work.20 3 So rather than
fighting capital on its own turf by defining labor in terms of ownership in one's

200

Fashion Valley Mall, L.L.C. v. NLRB, D.C. Cir. Ct. App. No. 04-1411, renumbered No.

S144753 (Cal. Dec. 24, 2007), available at http://courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/
S144753.PDF; Fashion Valley Mall, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 451 F.3d 241, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(certifying to California Supreme Court the question whether state law permits unions to access
Pruneyard-type shopping malls to engage in expressive activity where that activity requests
shoppers to boycott mall tenants); see Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(suggesting that NLRB interpretation of California law, which would have permitted unions special
access to stand-alone stores, outside the Pruneyard calculus, was unconstitutional because such
special access rules would constitute content-based discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment).
201COLLINS, supra note 156, at 9-10. Contra EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER part II, art. I; ITALY
CONST. art. 4.
202 For perhaps the best account of what a property right in employment might look like, see
Hepple, supra note 148; see also Lofaso, supra note 63, at 717-29.
203MACPHERSON, supra note 153, at 26.
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work - a definition that will lose a head-to-head conflict with capital's property
rights - I search for a more fundamental grounding on which to build workers'
rights. For this I return to the idea that the nature and extent of any legal right
reflects the value attached by the political system to various, often conflicting,
interests. To ground labor rights then, I turn to two fundamental values autonomy, which I explore in this section, and dignity, which I explore in the
following section.
B. Worker Autonomy Defined
In his seminal book, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford professor Joseph
Raz defines personal autonomy:
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should
make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own
life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own
2 4 destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions
throughout their lives.

0

20 5
For Raz, as with Hayek, "[a]utonomy is opposed to a life of coerced choices.
For Raz, it also "contrasts with a life with no choices, or of drifting through life
without ever exercising one's capacity to choose. 2 °6
It seems relatively simple to disaggregate the concept of personal
autonomy-being part author of one's own life-into the subcomponent part of
worker autonomy. Defining worker autonomy should answer the question: what
does it mean to be part author of one's working life? Applying Raz's autonomy
to the workplace, worker autonomy is simply that aspect of personal autonomy
whereby the "autonomous [worker] is a (part) author of his [or her work] life ...
controlling to some degree, [his or her] own destiny . . .through successive
decisions. 2 °7 Worker autonomy, while only one aspect of personal autonomy,
can itself be disaggregated. And so, worker autonomy can emanate from the job
itself both through job satisfaction and job security; arise from the worker's
personal experiences at the workplace; or arise from the worker's ability to
control his or her working life.
At one extreme, when a worker finds satisfaction from the job itself, then
any decision that changes that job-ranging from changing various tasks
associated with the job to terminating the job-potentially harms the worker's
autonomy. At the other extreme, even if the worker fails to find any meaning in
the job itself, even if the worker does not enjoy the job at all, a firing decision
can still harm the terminated worker's autonomy by separating the worker from
workplace experiences, such as meeting colleagues, making friends, being

204 RAZ,

205
20

supra note 161, at 369.

Id. at 371.

6 Id.

Id.at 369.
'o7
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financially independent, and enjoying the socio-economic status of being
employed.
In between the extremes of finding ultimate meaning in one's job and
finding little meaning in the job itself is simply the ability of workers to control
changes in his or her work life. The authors of the Bullock Report famously
recognized the importance of this aspect of work life:
The effect of those social changes has been an increasing desire among
employees to control their working environment and to have a say in
decisions which affect their working lives. They have become less prepared
to accept unquestioningly unilateral decisions made by management, and
have shown a readiness to challenge a decision if it seems to have ignored
their point of view or to affect them adversely. Traditional management
prerogatives have therefore come under attack, and the modem manager has
had to develop a style of participative management, which has recognized the
necessity and the benefits of involving employees in decision-making
rather
208
than imposing decisions upon them without consultation.
The Bullock Report endorsed the view that employees, who can influence
or even make decisions affecting their time spent at work, are employees who are
more apt to control other aspects of their lives.2 °9
C. Prerequisites of Worker Autonomy
Worker autonomy presupposes several conditions: (1) the mental ability to
identify work life influences; (2) access to information sufficient to generate a
range of options to workers; (3) independence from coercion; and (4) modes of
participation that empower workers to effect changes in their working lives.210
1. Workers Must be Able to Identify and Know How to Resolve Issues that
Affect Their Working Lives
Oxford educated political theorist Carole Pateman observes that
participating in industrial democracy serves an educative function by serving as a
prerequisite to creating a citizenry with an effective voice in government.21 1 In
other words, union democracy serves the instrumental purpose of teaching
citizens how to be good citizens. But to exercise real power over decisions that
affect one's life, citizens need equal power, which comes in the form of
participating in the decision-making process. Like citizens who learn how to be
208

BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 105,

8, at 23. The

BULLOCK REPORT

is the 1977 report of a

British committee chaired by Oxford historian Alan Bullock that proposed various forms of worker
participation to solve chronic industrial disputes.
'Id.
15, at25.
210 The first three of these prerequisites are based on Raz' three preconditions
of autonomy:

appropriate mental abilities, adequate range of options, and independence. RAz, supra note 161, at
372. The final prerequisite is based on the idea of participation and industrial democracy.
211 PATEMAN, supra note 154, at 42; see also BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984).
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good citizens through participation, workers can become an effective voice in
running businesses if they are sufficiently educated to identify and resolve issues
that affect their work life.
2. Workers Must Have Access to Information Adequate to Render Them a
Range of Options
To become autonomous authors of their work lives, employees must be able
to identify and resolve issues that affect their work life. Thus, employees must
not only be educated, in general--education that comes in part by participating in
the decision-making process-but workers must also have access to relevant
firm-specific information. Workers who are kept apprised of the business
welfare can make informed decisions about their short-term and long-term future
with the company. This precondition for effective workplace voice essentially
grounds any policy that promotes employee or union access to business
information.
3. Workers Must be Independent of the Coercive Power of the State, Their
Employer and Organized labor
To become part author of his or her working life, an employee must be
independent-free from the coercive power of the state, the employer, and fellow
employees. This condition highlights labor's autonomy as a countervailing force
to capital in the workplace, thereby reinforcing a pluralist view of industrial
relations. In other words, labor needs equal bargaining power to effectively
promote worker autonomy. Otherwise, labor and the employees it represents will
succumb to the coercive force of employers.
Application of this condition to labor does not necessarily generate similar
ramifications. The purpose of being free from the coercive power of big labor is
not to ensure that employees and their representatives have equal bargaining
power over the terms and conditions of employment. Rather, employee freedom
from union coercion simply illustrates the need for internal democratic
procedures to protect individual employees from the potentially coercive forces
endemic of any institution."
4. Summary
In short, worker autonomy means employees who (1) know what issues
affect their working lives and know how to resolve those issues according to their
own interests; (2) have access to information relevant to making informed
decisions; and (3) are free to effectively decide how to resolve those issues.

212

Alan Hyde discusses this issue in his seminal piece, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93

L.J. 793 (1984). In Hyde's view, union officials have a fiduciary duty to represent the
bargaining goals of those they represent and the represented employees have a right to adequate
and accurate information prior to contract ratification.
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Autonomous workers must, therefore, possess the power to effectuate these
decisions. But workers who do not gather together may simply not have the
power to control decisions affecting their working lives. Thus, worker autonomy
often implies some level of industrial or worker autonomy-the need for
meaningful employee participation at a variety of levels, a right to any
information management would deem necessary to effect wise business decisions
on behalf or property owners; state intervention to protect these worker rights to
be free from coercive forces, all set in a pluralist industrial or other workplace
framework.2 13
That respecting worker autonomy may result in some form of collective
action seems counterintuitive-after all, doesn't autonomy imply independence
and concerted activity imply subordination of the individual for the good of the
group? But the fact remains that most workers simply lack the power to become
part author of their working lives without acting in concert for the purpose of
mutual aid or protection. In many cases, that combination of labor power
enhances the individual autonomy of each worker.
D. Policies Respecting Industrial or Worker Autonomy
Autonomy (and dignity) tends to underlie explanatory procedures.21 4 Such
procedures may be formal-they may focus on vindicating claim rights, in which
case those rights will resemble property rights in labor; or nonformal-they are
responsive to the demands for revelation (giving reasons for the action in
question) and participation.215 There are several ways in which workers might
have greater say over decisions that affect their working lives. The most
common models include board-level participation, financial participation plans,
works councils, and collective bargaining.
1. Employee Participation at Board-Level
Board-level participation allows workers to have a say in the company's
actual management. Proponents of this view have adopted two main approaches.
The first advances a two-tiered board structure, which divides the board into
supervisory and managerial.2 16 Whereas the management board runs the
company, the supervisory council oversees the management board's work. This
view advances a pluralist conception of industrial relations: The interests of labor
and capital in a capitalist society inevitably conflict; therefore, the interests of
each group should be represented on the board. Management is no longer the
fiduciary agent of the shareholders, as is usually the case. Instead, the
See Hirsch & Hirsch, supranote 111.
Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PROCESS, 18 Y.B. AM. SOC. FOR POL. NoMos,126, 126-27 (J. Roland Pencock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1977).
213
214

215 Id. at 127.

216See generally Employee Participationand Company Structure in the EC, at 58-66, COM (1975)

570 final (Nov. 12, 1975).
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management board must implement the policies co-determined by both the
owners of capital and the workers-owners of labor. Bifurcating the managerial
and supervisory board functions opens up the possibility that the lower or
management board would usurp the power of the supervisory board. Thus, this
bicameral board can succeed only where management does not view itself as the
shareholders' agent and where the supervisory board is not controlled by
shareholders.
Thirty years ago, the Bullock Committee rejected the two-tier system and
recommended a unified board structure for the U.K. The Committee explained
that the purpose of having a unified over a bicameral board was two-fold: to give
employees actual decision-making power rather than supervised power, and to
promote industrial (or workplace) peace.
By establishing a forum for agreement on a framework of policy within
which management could act, the existence of such a board with parity
employee and shareholder representation could provide new legitimacy for
the exercise of the management function. Given the increasing tendency...
for employees to question more traditional bases of managerial authority, this
could be a key factor in making possible the fruitful co-operation between

management and labour needed to tackle and overcome our current industrial
problems.2 1 7

The Bullock Committee viewed its recommendation as squarely within the
capitalist tradition:
[I]f it is true, as we believe, that our prospects for economic recovery depend
largely on industry, then the need for a new basis of consent becomes even
more vital. In many companies and industries, it will not be possible to carry
though the necessary investment and reorganization programmes unless the
employees themselves are involved.2t8
Notwithstanding the Bullock Committee's view, the value in promoting
democratic ideals in not the resultant economic growth, which is valuable only
insofar as it brings about more fundamental values such as happiness. The true
value in promoting democratic workplace ideals is in protecting employee
autonomy (and dignity). Board-level worker participation without appropriate
safeguards will inevitably, collapse into a unitarist system of management
prerogatives, contrary to the values that such participation is supposed to
promote. In such cases, even if employees participate in the decision-making
process, harms to autonomy and dignity can surface. Employee representation
safeguards employee rights only to the extent that the internal mechanisms of
these participatory institutions are themselves democratic. 21 9 For board-level

217 BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 105, at 28, 8.
218 Id. 8 (quoting THE FABIAN SOCIETY, WORKERS IN THE BOARDROOM, Fabian Tract No. 441

(1976)).

219 MACPHERSON,

supra note 153, at 96-97; PATEMAN, supra note 154, at 22-44.
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representation to empower employees, there must be some parity in terms of
voting rights.
Moreover, successful board-level participation must be
supplemented by below-board employee participation.2 20
2. A Cautious Word About Financial Participation Plans
Financial participation schemes give workers a stake in the company and
therefore help create a sense of purpose in the company's overall well-being.
Financial participation schemes also tend to reduce information asymmetries,
thereby promoting worker autonomy by giving workers greater access to
information.221
But employers are typically reluctant to surrender their managerial
authority. Thus, to the extent that such schemes are designed to foster a unitarist
industrial (or workplace) framework, it becomes more difficult to see how they
actually enhance worker autonomy or worker dignity. This is especially true
where workers are not given controlling financial share. In such cases, financial
participation schemes are no more than a pseudo-participation technique used to
persuade employees to accept management's decisions.2 22 Financial schemes
that fail to grant actual control over the company may also fail to grant the power
necessary to make or even to influence decisions affecting the working lives of
employees. Moreover, such schemes duplicitously impose the management
perspective on employees, who now wear two caps--one as worker, the other as
shareholder. As worker, the individual is interested in higher wages, better
benefits and working conditions, and job security. As shareholder, the employee
is interested in dividends and profits. By linking wages to the company's overall
profitability or by fixing remuneration partially in terms of shares in the
company, financial participation schemes bring the interests of labor in line with
those of management, thereby creating a co-opted unitarist environment.
But financial participation schemes do not necessarilypromote unitarism2 23
To the extent that such schemes falsely create a unitarist environment, such
schemes will safeguard neither worker autonomy nor workers' socio-economic
rights. But while the interests of labor and those of capital inevitably conflict in a
market economy, these interests do not necessarily conflict where workers own
the means of production. In a socialist setting, financial participation may
enhance worker autonomy because participation grants workers actual decisionmaking power.224

220PATEMAN,supra note 154, at 22-44.
221 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Obstacles

to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of

Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other "Survivalists," 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 967-77 (1998).
222 PATEMAN, supra note 154, at 68-69.
223 Hirsch, supra note 221, at 1005-11 (arguing that there is enough flexibility in collective
bargaining to perhaps allow a collective bargaining structure and employee stock ownership plans
to co-exist).
224 That the NLRB would exclude employees who control the enterprise from NLRA coverage,
thus signals the great extent to which the NLRA presumes a capitalist economic system. See
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As with board-level participation, workers cannot exert decision-making
power if they are outnumbered by those representing contrary interests.
Similarly, financial participation schemes cannot safeguard economic and social
rights of workers if the workers' voice can be drown out by other more powerful
voices.
3. Pluralism-Balancing Collective Autonomy with Individual Autonomy
a. Overview
In a capitalist society, where employers and property owners by default
make most employment decisions, pluralist systems of industrial democracy
enhance overall worker-autonomy by giving workers a shared voice in how to
organize workplace issues. The two most common forms of workplace pluralism
in the advanced capitalist societies are works councils and collective bargaining.
Both systems extend participation rights to workers and increase the issues over
which workers will have decision-making power. But while such decisionmaking may increases overall autonomy, the cost may decrease a particular
individual's personal autonomy in some circumstances. As shown below,
pluralists systems grounded in principles of autonomy safeguard against these
problems.
b. Works Councils
Works councils, which have developed in Europe, particularly Germany,
225
Works councils are companyare regulated by a European Union directive.
In
specific institutions, established by management,226 to represent employees.
theory, the employer and the works council meet periodically for the purpose of
"informing and consulting employees." 228 Because the "spirit of cooperation"
underlies the theory of works councils, the law mandates that negotiations always
be with "a view to reaching agreement., 229 Along these lines, compliance with
the works council directive is generally not through economic weapons but rather
through administrative or judicial proceedings established by each member
state. 0 The issues over which such rights preside varies; but naturally, the wider
the range of issues, the more democratic the works council, and the narrower the
231
range of issues covered, the stronger the universe of management prerogatives.

Citywide Country Transp., Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 444, 445-46 & nn.8-11 (2002) (Member Liebman
questions this assumption in a concurring opinion).
225 Council Directive 94/45,1994 O.J. (L 254) 64 (EC).
226 Id. at art. 4.
227 Id. at art. 2(1)(g), 2(2), annex.

Id. at art. 1(1).
Id. at arts. 6(1), 9.
Id. at art. 11(3).

228
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c. Collective Bargaining
Beatrice and Sidney Webb coined the term collective bargaining "to
describe an agreement concerning pay and conditions of work settled between
trade unions on the one hand and owner or association of employers on the
other. 2 32 The term includes all negotiations between employers and employees
accomplished collectively through employee representative institutions. 23 The
resultant agreement is known as a collective agreement which may, under the
laws of contract, be binding as in the U.S., or not binding as in the U.K.234 This
agreement can be viewed as (1) an industrial peace treaty; (2) a bill reflecting and
ensuring industrial democracy through the joint-regulation of the workplace; and
(3) a document that establishes work rules, thus providing a system of industrial
justice.23 ' As the Donovan Report explained, "[p]roperly conducted, collective
bargaining is the most effective means of giving workers the right to
representation in decisions affecting their working lives, a right236which is or
should be the prerogative of every worker in a democratic society.
The collective bargaining system functions in part to protect the legitimate
expectations of labor and management, which inevitably conflict in a market
economy. 237 "The main object of labour law has always been . . . to be a
countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is
inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship. 2 38 By not
recognizing a final decision-making authority but rather several potential sources
of authority, a collective-bargaining system is necessarily based on the pluralist
view of industrial relations.
Originally, the collective bargaining system emerged as a laissez-faire
solution to the problem of inequality of bargaining power. Neither side of
industry was interested in government regulation of industrial relations.2 40 But in
most industries labor has proven too weak to bargain effectively with
management. The legal solution was to grant positive rights to labor to

270 (3d. ed. 1986).
Id.
234 Act of Aug. 28. 1958, 72 Stat. 997, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

232 LORD WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW
233

1974, §11 l(a)(1), 88 Stat. 829.
supra note 232, at 270.

235 WEDDERBURN,

236 ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS, REPORT OF

1965-1968,

Cmnd. 3623, at 54, 212 [hereinafter DONOVAN REPORT].
237 PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABOUR AND THE LAW 65-66 (3d. ed.

1983).

18.
See generally ALLAN Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS (1974);
Richard Hyman, Pluralism, Procedural Consensus and Collective Bargaining, 16 BRIT. J. OF
INDUS. REL.16 (1978); Clegg, supra note 103, at 309-16; Allan Flanders, Collective Bargaining:A
TheoreticalAnalysis, 6 BRrr. J.OF INDUS. REL. 1 (1968).
240 DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 236, 40, at 10.
1381d. at
239
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organize.241 The main role of the state was to support the institution of collective
242
bargaining, and to abstain from interfering with the actual bargaining process.
Other than this minimal role, labor leaders viewed collective bargaining as an
alternative to both individual bargaining and government regulation in dealing
243
with issues facing the working person.
The level of employee participation in collective bargaining depends greatly
on the bargaining strength of the trade union involved. Strong unions have at
times been able to negotiate status quo clauses into collective agreements,
whereby management agrees not to take decisions affecting employee interests,
including decisions affecting the size of the work force, without first exhausting
negotiation procedures. 2 " Collective bargaining developed to this degree is
called joint-regulation.2 45 While a number of issues have traditionally been
viewed as within management's prerogative to decide unilaterally, 246 the stronger
the union, the greater the range of issues decided collectively and the smaller the
scope of management prerogatives.24 7
Given that the strength of a collective bargaining system varies with the
economy, there are limits to the effectiveness of collective bargaining to generate
policies protecting the weakest members. Higher unemployment rates correlate
with weaker union bargaining strength. Although the unemployed have special
needs, they have neither the political nor economic strength to satisfy those needs
in a free market economy. Where unemployment rates are high, a purely
collective laissez-faire model of industrial relations invariably fails to protect the
socio-economic rights of those most vulnerable to cyclical unemployment.
d. The Price of Pluralism
Pluralist systems tend to increase overall worker autonomy by using
collective power to enhance bargaining strength (and derivatively, to increase
access to information). In fact, the U.S. system of collective bargaining is built
upon some of the same foundations as Raz's conception of personal autonomy24824
access to information
and independence from coercive sources of power.

241See,

e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, §76, 31 Stat. 155, repealedby Congressional Reports
Elimination Act of 1980, §110, 94 Stat. 2239. A positive right to organize has not always been
legislatively protected in Britain, where trade unions historically have been far more skeptical of
government regulation than their American counterparts.
242
243

DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 236, 39-40, at 10.
Flanders, supra note 239, at 1-3 (citing SIDNEY

WEBB

&

BEATRICE WEBB,

DEMOCRACY, at v (1902 ed.).
244 Employee Participationand Company Structure in the EC, supranote
245

Id. at 94.

INDUSTRIAL

216.

supra note 236, 93, at 24-25.
Id. 1 141-51, at 35-36 (distinguishing between the formal and informal system of British
industrial relations and showing how developed systems of collective bargaining are able to
encroach on management prerogatives).
248 Under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (2007)), an employer's statutory duty
includes an obligation "to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for
246 DONOVAN REPORT,
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Workers in collective relationships tend to have greater control over their work
lives, because they have the right to bargain over their wages and other terms and
conditions of employment and also the right to information relevant to their
working conditions.
But in exchange for the protections afforded workers as a whole, workers
themselves surrender a degree of individual autonomy to the collective
institution. This trade-off is true in any democratic system-political, economic,
or otherwise. In these situations, it becomes necessary to protect the individual
from the coercive power of the group, which is precisely what this model of
worker autonomy does. Under this model, unions, employers and the state may
not subjugate human rights for the sake of efficiency. This is why pluralist
systems that value worker autonomy take seriously the effect that such systems
have on individual rights.' 0 Nor may those institutions sacrifice the human
rights of some in exchange for greater freedoms for others. The obvious example
of the latter is a slave-based system, which is unjustifiable in a pluralist economic
system grounded in worker autonomy, because it subjugates the autonomy of an
entire class of people. Truly close calls can be seen on a daily basis at the
bargaining table, when bargaining representatives have to make trade-offs based
on the often conflicting interests of their constituents. It was this concern about
the individual that has led to the development of the duty-of-fair-representation
doctrine 251' and the balance between the rights of unions and union members.
Although unions have an interest in receiving dues for representational purposes,
union members have an interest in ensuring their union dues are not being used
for political purposes .252
For all these reasons, autonomy must be coupled with dignity to create a
normatively justifiable system of industrial relations. The autonomous worker
then is someone whose dignity the law treats with the same respect it treats other
workers as well as other human players, such as individual business owners. The
dignified worker is someone whose autonomy the law treats with equal respect or
on par with the autonomy of private property owners. With this, I now turn to
the dignity principle.

the proper performance of its duties," including information that is relevant to contract
administration, negotiations, and grievance processing. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432,
435-37 (1967); accordDetroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979).
249 The NLRA prohibits both employers and unions from "coerce[ing] employees" in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed in ch. 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2007).
250 I leave aside the difficult question whether the right to dissociate truly fits this model, or
whether the negative effects on overall worker autonomy outweigh the positive effects on the
particular individual.
251Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
252 Commc'n Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); California Saw & Knife Works,
320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), enforced sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813 (1998).
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VI. THE LAW'S ROLE IN PROMOTING WORKER DIGNITY
A. Dignity Defined
The ruling idea behind the ideal of dignity is that individual members of a
community should treat each and every other member of that community as
persons of independent moral worth.25 3 This ideal has several conceptions that
come together to form both the formal and substantive content of rights
supported by the dignity value.2 '
As a right enforceable against the state, dignity signifies in part that
"individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and
administration of the political institutions that govern them., 255 In this respect,
the late Harvard philosophy professor John Rawls (1921-2002) observed:
"[E]quality is essentially justice as regularity. It implies accordingly impartial
application and consistent interpretation of rules according to such precepts as to
treat similar cases similarly., 256 As a right enforceable against other institutions,
such as employers or even unions, dignity demands that these institutions,
created for the benefit of natural persons, treat their beneficiaries with equal
concern and respect. To the extent an individual's power to decide is shared with
or subordinated by other individuals or institutions, the individual is entitled to
certain procedural rights that safeguard the individual's substantive rights. These
procedural rights are enforceable against the state, other individuals, or the
institution itself.
B. Procedural Safeguards
Applying the dignity principle to our hypothetical legal system, it is hardly
controversial to proclaim that the law must provide procedural safeguards for
workplace disputes. Who decides is, of course, a threshold question-one that
overlaps with questions generated under a legal system supported by Razian
autonomy. The act of participating in that democratic process not only enhances
worker autonomy but also dignifies individual workers. But assuming some sort
of participation in the decision-making process (e.g., unions, works councils,
board-level participation), decision-makers must address more the substantive
questions regarding the equality between the haves and have nots, the working
class and the ruling class.

253 RONALD DWORKIN,TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 181 (1977); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE

504-512 (1972).
For a discussion of those aspects of dignity that tend to generate welfare rights, see supra
Part III(n)(4)-(5).
255 DWORKIN, supra note 253, at 180, 272.
256 RAWLS, supra note 253, at 504.
254
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C. Substantive Equal Treatment
Free market advocates claim that the free market will necessarily order and
allocate rights efficiently.25 7 This article goes a long way towards eviscerating
that argument. But even if true, it would remain inappropriate for the state to
leave it to the free market to order such rights because the free market cannot
guarantee "substantive equal treatment., 2 8 As Rawls points out, "[t]he real
assurance of equality [or dignity] lies in' ' the
59 content of the principles of justice
and not in these procedural assumptions.
The most inflammatory, and most extreme, example of this is the market in
slave labor. Whether or not the slave labor market during the early nineteenth
century was efficient, the fact remained that it was immoral because it subjugated
the dignity and autonomy of people to the coercive power of the state and private
property owners. The use of child labor is another example. And, in this
country, the use of modem-day sweat shops and coercion of immigrant labor are
other patently obvious examples.
But there are many other examples of human subjugation to efficiency that
we, as a society, continue to tolerate for the sake of global competitiveness or
greater conveniences for more people. For example, we find acceptable the
dangers faced by coal miners--because low health and safety standards means
cheaper heating bills.260 We accept that forty-six million Americans, or 15.7% of
our population, are without healthcare coverage, because that means cheaper
labor costs and therefore lower prices for the consumer. 6'
Keeping in mind questions like these-are workplace health and safety
regulations adequate, and are Americans covered in case of unemployment,
sickness, disability, or old-age-the less obvious view arises. Any theory that
grounds labor law and takes seriously the autonomous dignified worker must
account for questions dealing with benefits and social security. With this, I
explore the three most common, competing models of social security in search
for the model that best serves the autonomous dignified worker.

257

See supra notesl 1-46 and accompanying text.

258 RAWLS,
259

supra note 253, at 507.

Id.; see also MACPHERSON, supra note 153. But see HAYEK, supra note 11, at 133-147; HAYEK,

supra note 19, at 62-100.
260 See generally Anne M. Lofaso, Approaching Coal Mine Safetyfrom a Comparative Law and
InterdisciplinaryPerspective, II W. VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008), availableat
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfin?abstractid--993830.
261 National Coalition on Healthcare,
Healthcare Coverage, http://www.nchc.org/facts/
coverage.shtml (last visited Sept 17, 2007).
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VII. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: THE STATE'S ROLE IN
PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF UNEMPLOYED
WORKERS
A. Overview
Social security schemes are state-sponsored measures for maintaining
income during periods of employment interruptions including unemployment,
sickness, old age and youth.2 2 I limit my discussion here to provisions for
unemployment. Social scientists have developed three models for security
against unemployment: insurance or contributions-based; residualist or needsbased; and social citizenship or rights-based models.263 Below I explore how
each model answers the following questions: Who is covered? To what extent
and for how long? What is the model's redistributive impact? How are the plans
funded and who bears the financial burden? What is the model's function? Are
there supplemental schemes that would enhance the model's effectiveness? By
examining the models, I conclude that each model is derivative of more
fundamental values which I identify, and then I conclude that the rights-based
model best promotes the autonomous dignified worker.
B. Residualist (Needs-Based) Model
1. The Model
Under the residualist model, everyone (citizen or resident) "is entitled to
assistance if they are in need" and for as long as they are in need.2 64 This
universality of coverage gives symbolic, communitarian appeal to the model.265
Need is the crucial concept here. When defined according.to a subsistence
standard of poverty, the need model approaches the free market ideal. In stark
contrast, when defined according to relativist conceptions of poverty, the model
tends to be more progressive. 66

262 T.H. MARSHALL, SOCIAL POLICY 11 (Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. 1975) (1965) (citing convention

adopted by the International Labour Organization in 1952).
263 Alan Ware & Robert E. Goodin, Introduction to NEEDS

AND WELFARE

1, 5 (Alan Ware &

Robert E. Goodin eds., 1990); RICHARD M. TITMuSS, SOCIAL POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION (Brian
Abel-Smith & Kay Titmuss eds., 1974) (slightly different classifications).
264Ware & Goodin, supra note 263, at 5.
265Ronald Dworkin, Truth and Justice, Philosophy Seminar at University College, Oxford (Feb. 24,
1993).
ALCOCK, supra note 49, at 5 ("relative poverty is based on the idea that the measure of poverty,

266

and consequently the numbers of people deemed to be living in poverty, can only be determined in
relation to the standard of living of all members of any particular society."); Id. at 8 (discussing
relative deprivation conceptions of poverty); TOWNSEND, supra note 49, at 55; Robert E. Goodin,
Relative Needs, in NEEDS AND WELFARE, supra note 263, at 12, 12; SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED
SERVICES, REPORT BY SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, 1943, Cmd. 6404, at 170,
457 (hereinafter
BEVERIDGE REPORT).
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In a free market state, need is often defined more minimally to denote the
basic resources required for subsistence. 67 Eligibility is universal and coverage
is potentially unlimited in duration.2 68 But citizens must apply for benefits
through means-testing because coverage is limited to those below subsistence
level.269 If state agents who administer the system determine that the individual
does in fact fall below the defined poverty line, the agents commit state resources
to bringing that individual up to subsistence level. 270 Means-testing allows the
state to commit a greater proportion of its resources to the genuinely needy, but
requires administrative expenditure and breaks the symbolic appeal of
universality. 27' Means-testing also becomes a convenient method for shaping
behavior and for judging character among the economically disadvantaged.
The redistributive impact of this model is limited by the definition of need.
To broaden redistributive impact, the state might consider theories of relative
need and deprivation, levy progressive taxes to fund plans, or turn to
contributions-based schemes. This model also suffers from a lack of curative
solutions. If this model were the basis for social security, it would require
several supplementary schemes to enhance its effectiveness including social
policies that prevent unemployment and promote full employment, sponsoring
vocational training and retraining programs, and greater redistribution policies
for funding the plan.
2. Values Underlying the Model
A narrowly defined needs-based model values social and economic
inequality. Moreover, rather than promoting individual autonomy, this model
champions state intervention into individual lives through means-testing and by
lending itself to conduct-based scrutiny of individuals. Significantly then, the
minimal state contemplated by free market conservatives is not an unregulated
state. Such conduct-based scrutiny is supported by the supposition that there are
only two natural channels through which an individual's needs can properly be
met-the market and the family. "Only when these break down should social
welfare institutions come into play and then only temporarily. ' 2 72 Because the
state's role is by definition limited, the state is required to parcel out resources
sparingly.
A needs-based model established on more expansive definitions of need
tend to value dignity, substantive autonomy, and redistributive justice-although
the model might still permit intrusive means testing. The question then becomes
how to justify a more expansive definition of need. A good starting place is
Rawls' difference principle: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b)
267 Ware
26
1Id. at

& Goodin, supra note 263, at 5,
5-6.

id
Ware & Goodin, supra note 263, at 5-6.
271 Dworkin, supranote 265.
272 TIrMuss, supra note 263, at 30-31.
269

270
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attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity. 2 73 Rawls agrees that basic needs must be met and therefore would
fall under his liberty principle.274 Any welfare policy that does not cover basic
needs and2 does
not comport with human dignity would be unjust and Pareto
75
inefficient.

C. The insurance (contributions-based) model
1. The model
The insurance model does not grant universal benefits,2 76 but instead
provides benefits only to those who have made past contributions. In the case of
post-termination insurance, the advent of unemployment triggers the receipt of
benefits. The amount of benefits corresponds to the level of past contributions
regardless of need.277 Benefits end either when the individual returns to work or
when the individual's claim-right to the benefit ceases. This model is not
designed to redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor, although there is
redistribution "across time within the life cycle of single individuals or their
families. 2 78 In effect, the individual is insured against periods of high
unemployment.
Employee, employer, or state contributions can fund the insurance plan.
Contributions tend to be involuntary. In general, the state compels individuals
and employers to contribute to the insurance

pool. 2 79

Compulsory contributory

funding helps to universalize the insurance model's coverage and also gives the
state additional redistributive opportunities via the state's taxation scheme.28 °
A modified contributions-based model can provide for progressive
contributions based on earnings. To the extent the plan is funded through tax
monies, the burden of unemployment falls upon society as a whole. To the
extent the plan is funded jointly by employee-employer contributions, the burden
is arguably on the employee. Although the employer may contribute to the fund,
it may compensate for that contribution by lowering overall wages. Linking
employer contributions to number of employees terminated rather than overall
number of employees may help increase employer contributions by making it
more expensive for employers to terminate workers. Consequently, more
workers might remain employed and off unemployment insurance.

273 RAWLS, supra note 253, at 83.
274
275

id.
See also C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation To ConstitutionallyProtected Liberty, 134

PA. L. REV.741, 745-46. Rawls' difference principle also provides for more fundamental wealth
redistribution,
but I leave analysis of that question for a later article.
276
U.

BEVERIDGE REPORT, supra note 266.
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278

& Goodin, supra note 263, at 6-7.
Id.at7.
279
BEVERIDGE REPORT, supra note 266, 24, at 12-13.
280
Id. 24, at 13.
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In its purest form, the insurance model is preventative, and protects
individuals from "being in need at times of their lives when they are most at
risk.",281 But insurance plans are not comprehensive. Methods for enhancing the
plan's effectiveness include additional preventative measures (shifting part of the
cost burden of unemployment contributions on to employers) and curative
(providing vocational training and retraining opportunities).
2. Values underlying the model
The driving impetus behind the insurance model has been the idea of
responsibility through social insurance. In his governmental report, Sir William
Beveridge developed the modern prototype for the British welfare state.282 The
Beveridge model sought to cover all contributors for the period of unemployment
and would be supplemented by other poverty-reducing welfare programs.283
Employers, employees, and the state would help finance the program, thus
ensuring some redistributive impact.284
Beveridge's theme is to eliminate want through social insurance.285 The
seminal legal idea behind that theme is a contract between the citizen and the
286
state "achieved by cooperation between the State and the individual.
Although under Beveridge's plan, individuals have claim-rights against the state
to a certain level of subsistence, the individual has duties to the state as well.287
And although the state has an obligation to provide security for its citizenry, the
state also has the right to demand "service and contribution" in exchange.288
Thus, according to Beveridge:
Under the scheme of social insurance, which forms the main feature of this
plan, ever citizen of working age will contribute to his appropriate class
according to the security that he needs .... Each will be covered for all his
needs by a single weekly contribution on one insurance document. All the
principal cash payments ... will continue so long as the need lasts, without
means test, and will be paid from a Social Insurance Fund built up by
contributions from the insured persons, from their employers, if any, and
from the State.289

The Beveridge contract has three salient features: universality coupled with
involuntariness; mutuality; and unlimited benefit duration. 290 These features
roughly correspond to the modern justificatory bases of social security-

281

Ware & Goodin, supra note 263, at 7.
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citizenship, insurance, and need. Coverage is universal because every citizen of
working age must participate. The contract trades state security for individual
contribution. That security lasts for the duration of the need.
Although best known for its insurance component, taken as a whole, the
Beveridge Plan blends elements of social insurance with need and citizenship.
Beveridge's social security model is a composite because it asks and answers not
only the question, "what can the state do to help the unemployed?", but also the
question, "what can the state do to alleviate the greater social question of
unemployment?" The Beveridge model is not a social contact for unemployment
insurance but rather a contract for social security, in general. Although social
security extends to all individuals, specific forms of social security may not be
universal. Thus, to understand Beveridge's scheme for unemployment insurance,
it is necessary to understand that scheme as part of a universal plan for social
security, and as one part of a larger plan for social progress-a plan to eliminate
all need, with unemployment insurance focusing on working individuals who had
lost their jobs.
The elimination of need, then, is an important theme running throughout
Beveridge's plan for social progress. Need, however, is not Beveridge's primary
concern in thinking of ways to find income substitution during short-term
unemployment. Rather, Beveridge's unemployment insurance plan must be
understood as a contributions-based, social insurance policy within a larger,
needs-based "scheme of social insurance against interruption and destruction of
earning power"... 2 '9' For Beveridge, the larger goal-to eliminate want-can
be accomplished through double redistribution of income, redistribution through
time and redistribution from wealthy to poor. In theory, this should provide
social insurance "against interruption or loss of earning power,'2 92 and then
"adjustment of incomes" to meet family needs.293
Beveridge's idea of social insurance originally guided the insurance model.
Advocates of the free market and "deregulation" have, however, co-opted the
model by replacing the idea of social insurance with those of freedom of contract,
self-reliance, merit and efficiency.2 94
D. Social citizenship (Rights-Based) Model
1. The Model
The social citizenship model provides for universal coverage. 295 A person
has a right to unemployment insurance and other social security derived from

'9

1d.17, at 9.
Id. 12, at 7.

292
293
294
295

Id. 13, at 7-8.
See discussion supra Part III(C)(3).
Ware & Goodin, supra note 263, at 7.
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membership in a community. 296 Benefits are of unlimited duration and cover all
needs, usually defined relative to the community's living standards.2 97
The function of social insurance and related social services under this
model is to provide community members with the means of participating fully as
members of the society.298 To function as full citizens, the state endows
community members with civil, political, and socio-economic rights.2 99 The
social element of these rights comprise:
[T]he whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and
security to the right to share in the full in the social heritage and to live the
life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.
connected with it are the educational system and
The institutions most
300 closely
the social services.
The model also provides for a right to work as part of the civil rights of any
citizen. 30 1 The social citizenship model is redistributive:
Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a
community. All who posses the status are equal with respect to the rights and
duties with which the status is endowed .... [S]ocieties in which citizenship
is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against
which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be
directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a
fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is
made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is
bestowed.30 2
The insurance scheme under this model might be funded through progressive tax
contributions.
The model defines need with such depth and breadth (any social service
necessary for an individual to participate in that society) that, like the broad
conception of a property right in employment, an unemployment plan based on
this model is broadly preventative. The model focuses on education, vocational
training and retraining, and employment continuity.
2. Values Underlying the Model
The social citizenship model collapses into a need-based model, sans
Thus, substantive
means-testing, where need is defined comparatively.
autonomy, dignity, and substantive justice underlie the citizenship model for
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social justice. The model also reinforces the model for more participatory
industrial democratic solutions to unemployment. Pateman, Barber and Bullock
have all indicated that participation at work is necessary for citizens to participate
frilly as community members.3 °3 The model therefore embraces democratic
values of participation 3°4 and the social value of equality.30 5
The interesting question is-what justifies this expansive model? The most
cogent argument in favor of a citizenship model looks to community obligations,
obligations to future generations, and redistribution. °6 In a liberal democratic
state that treats its citizens as equals, redistributive burdens are "appropriate only
when that community offers [the individual], at a minimum, the opportunity to
develop and lead a life he can regard as valuable both to [her or] himself and to
it. ' ' Citizens "with the proper sense of [their] own independence and equal
worth can take pride in a community" where two conditions are met.308 First, the
individual "in some ways draws on and contributes to these public virtues. 30 9
Second, the individual "has some power to help determine the shape of that
future, and only if the promised prosperity will provide at least equal benefit to
the smaller, more immediate communities for which he [or she] feels special
responsibilities."3 10 Although these conditions are seemingly minimal,
[t]ogether they impose serious restraints on any policy that denies any group
of citizens, however small or politically negligible, the equal resources that
equal concern would otherwise grant them . . . . So if economic policy
contemplates an increase in unemployment, it must also31 contemplate
generous public provision for retraining or public employment. 1
VIII. FIRST STEPS-A MODERATE SOCIAL ACTION PROGRAM
If the social-dignitarian model for promoting autonomous dignified workers
generates policies such as due process rights, collective bargaining, a statutory
floor of rights, and the welfare state, then is my model merely descriptive? Or,
can we use the model to think in different ways about laws governing the
American workplace? As outlined below, I believe the model can help us to

303 See generally PATEMAN, supra note 154; BARBER, supra note

201;

BULLOCK REPORT supra note

105.

304 See BARBER, supra note 211.
Marshall, supra note 122, at 72-74; see also Desmond S. King & Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship,
Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision, 18 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 415, 423 (1988)
(discussing Marshall's focus on equality).
306 See DwORKiN, MP, supra note 127, at 210.
307
Id. at 210-11.
308 Id. at 211.
39 id.
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think more creatively about how to generate public policy solutions to the deeply
troubling questions of economic inequality that plague this country.3 12
Let me begin with collective activity, which is complicated because all
three branches of government--Congress, the courts, and even the NLRB-have
taken what was initially conceived of as the free market solution to market
failures in individual bargaining31 3 and transformed it into a less effective
solution to these market failures, all in the name of economic efficiency. In
particular, opponents of collective bargaining have viewed unions as intruding on
employer autonomy by cutting into employer decision-making authority and as
being inefficient by raising the cost of doing business by imposing penalties for
breach of the employment contract.
Each branch of government played its role in altering the NLRA to
accommodate these economic objections.
Congress' 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments have diminished worker dignity by limiting the reach of the Act's
protection. In particular, Congress redefined the term employee to exclude
supervisors and independent contractors.314 The 1947 amendments have also
limited worker autonomy principally by banning 3many of labor's most powerful
316
economic weapons including jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts.
The Supreme Court has followed suit. The Supreme Court has further dedignified and repressed our autonomous dignified worker: the Court narrowed
the definition of employee by reading managerial workers out of the Act's
312 Many of the reforms I set forth below fit into the litigation strategy model that Professor Ellen J.
Dannin puts forth. See ELLEN J. DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAW (2006).

313 NLRA section 1 makes clear that collective bargaining is intended as a free market solution to a
perceived market failure:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
29 U.S.C. § 151. In other words, the NLRA framers believed that by equalizing bargaining power
through collective bargaining, the private parties would come to an allocatively efficient and fair
distribution of a company's profits in the form of wages and other terms and conditions of
employment.
314 Taft-Hartley Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (2007), legislatively overruling Packard Motor Car Co.
v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) andNLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
315 Jurisdictional strikes are strikes between rival unions over the right to perform specific work.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D) (2007) (making it an unfair labor practice for unions to engage in
jurisdictional strikes over work assignments); 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (authorizing the NLRB to hold
"10(k) hearings" to determine whether a genuine work assignment dispute exists and if so to award
the work to one of the rival unions if such a jurisdictional dispute does exist); NLRB v. Radio &
Television Broad. Eng'rs Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
316 Secondary boycotts are concerted refusals to work for, purchase from, or handle the products of
neutral businesses to encourage those neutral employers to pressure the employer with which the
group has a dispute. When the group organizing the secondary boycott is a labor union, the
secondary boycott is an unfair labor practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
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protections 317 and rejecting the Board's attempts to extend the Act's protections
to certain professional employees. 318 Within two years of declaring the National
Labor Relations Act constitutional, the Supreme Court essentially banned sitdown strikes by workers protesting unfair labor practices, on the theory that the
workers had interfered with the employer's property rights. 31 9 The Supreme
Court further diluted the remaining economic weapons available to unions by
reading no-strike clauses into collective-bargaining agreements in the name of
industrial peace 320 and extending Taft-Hartley's secondary boycott prohibitions
to "common situs" picketing-at the Board's instigation.12 ' And the Supreme

Court has further narrowed employees' rights to receive information about
unions by limiting union access to employer property.322
Even the NLRB, representing the executive branch, has narrowed employee
rights, thereby repressing and de-dignifying the autonomous dignified worker.
Until recently, the most notable restrictions by the NLRB involved piggybacking
on the Supreme Court's 2001 Kentucky River 323 restriction on the organizing

317 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
318 See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980) (holding, in disagreement with the
Board, that private university's full-time faculty members whose "authority in academic matters
was absolute" were not employees protected by the NLRA because they exercised supervisory and
managerial functions); see also NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706,
712-22 (2001) (rejecting, in the nurse context, Board's attempt to interpret the statutory exemption
"supervisor" in light of the definition of "professional employee" by rejecting Board's
interpretation of the ambiguous term "independent judgment" to exclude those who exercise
"ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services
in accordance with employer-specified standards") (internal quotation marks omitted); NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 578-80 (1994) (rejecting, in the nurse
context, Board's interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" prong of the definition of
3supervisor).
19

NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
320 See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974); Local
174 v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Indeed, in Gateway Coal, the Court read the arbitration
clause to waive the right to strike even though the union had specifically negotiated eliminating
from the applicable collective-bargaining agreement all no-strike provisions that were in prior
contracts. 414 U.S. at 390 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
321 Common situs picketing is picketing at a job site with several employers, even though the labor
union has a dispute with only one of those employers. See Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 68082 (1961) (applying secondary boycott principles to "common situs" picketing, in context where
employer established separate gates for neutral and primary employers, and prohibiting such
picketing at the neutral gates so long as that gate is used only by neutral employees or suppliers).
322 See discussion of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1992), supra notes 153, 187202 and accompanying text. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty
after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REv. 305, 308-09 n.21 (1994) (arguing that "Lechmere essentially
recognized an employer's right to exclude others not only for 'good reasons,' but for 'bad reasons'
or for no reason at all", and that this principle represents an "both an impoverished conception of
section 7 rights and an overbroad, undifferentiated vision of employer property rights" that is not
supported by legitimate business interests, the NLRA, or even state property law in some cases.).
323 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
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rights of professional workers by expanding the definition of supervisor,324
removing from the Act's protection certain subclasses,325 taking away the right of
nonunion workers to request a witness during investigatory or disciplinary
diluting economic weapons. 32 But lately, the NLRB has come
meetings, 326 and diuig327
down with a series of cases that so impoverish employees' Section 7 rights as to
perhaps suggest an antipathy to Section 7's protection of concerted activity, and
certainly to further subordinate and de-dignify the autonomous dignified worker.
The NLRB recently held that paid union organizers or "salts," who the
Supreme Court has held are statutory employees,32 are not statutory employees
in circumstances where the salt does not intend to accept a job if offered.
Accordingly, as with student employees and disabled workers,3 the NLRB is
reading certain subclasses of employees out of the NLRA's protection by
claiming that the salt who wants only to test the employer's obedience to the law
or to provoke an unfair labor practice is not attempting to engage in an economic
relationship and therefore is not a statutory employee. 330 To compound matters,
the NLRB places the burden of proving the salt's "genuine[] interest in becoming
[an] employee[]" on the General Counsel. 33' These new rules, which the dissent
characterizes as frustrating the purposes of the NLRA as examined by the
Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge and Town & Country,332 essentially resurrects

Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2006); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B.
No. 38 (2006); Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (2006).
325 Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004) (holding that teaching and research assistants at
324

private universities are students rather than statutory employees); BrevardAchievement Ctr., Inc.,
342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (2004) (holding that "severely disabled" employees working as janitors are
not statutory employees because their employment was primarily rehabilitative rather than
economic). This approach of denying a statute's protection to a particular subgroup of citizens
because that group can be characterized in a way that both permits and denies protection has been
rejected by some reviewing courts as unreasonable. See, e.g., Osorio v. I.N.S. , 18 F.3d 1017, 1028
(2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting Board of Immigration appeals contention that Guatamalan labor union
leader's request for asylum on grounds of political opinion did not amount to a request for
"political asylum" because that union leader's fear of persecution was fundamentally economic).
As the court pointed out, the government's reasoning is like claiming that "Solzhenitsyn would not
have been eligible for political asylum because his dispute with the former Soviet Union is properly
characterized as a literary, rather than a political, dispute." Id. at 1029.
326 In IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004), the Board reversed Epilepsy Found. of Northeast
Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), enforced in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), a case
where the Board applied the principles of NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) to a
"nonunionized setting... permit[ting] an employee to have a coworker present at an investigatory
interview that the employee reasonably believed might result in discipline."
327 Yale Univ., 330 N.L.R.B. 246 (1999) (graduate teaching fellow grade strike constitutes
unprotected
partial strike).
32 8
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 92, 96-98 (1995) (holding that paid union
organizers or salts are statutory employees).
329 See Yale Univ., supranote 327.
330
Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. 4 (Sep. 29, 2007).
331 Id. (placing burden on General Counsel).
332 Toering Elec. Co., slip op. 18-19 (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185
(1941) (holding that job applicants are statutory employees) and NLRB v. Town & Country Elec.,
516 U.S. 85 (1995)). In Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 185, the Supreme Court famously observed,
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the argument rejected by the Town & Country Court that a paid union organizer
cannot be a statutory employee because of divided loyalties between the
employer and the union. Relying on the common law definition of servant, the
Town & Country Court explained that a "'person may be the servant of two
masters ... at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve
abandonment of the service to the other.' '333 The Board's suggestion to the
contrary-that to come within the NLRA's protective cover a salt must be
"genuinely interested in seeking to establish an employment relationship with the
employer 334 flies in the face of well-settled precedent.335
It is notable that this NLRB decision on the definition of the statutory term
employee in the salting context comes on the heels of another NLRB decision to
limit the backpay remedy available to salts.336 The Board has thereby cut off the
remedy, just in Case there is any right remaining.337 And by applying Lechmere's
principle of removing nonemployee union access to employees while cutting off
employee access to employees through salts, the NLRB has so restricted the right
of employees to learn about the benefits of organization at the workplace, 338 as to
not only proffer an unreasonable interpretation of the NLRA but also reveal a
hostility for union organizing.
In keeping with a "hard-in" theme, the NLRB has also changed the rules of
voluntary recognition. Most significantly, the NLRB has removed the voluntary
recognition bar for the first 45 days following the recognition. 339 The Board's

"[d]iscrimination against union labor in the hiring of men is a dam to self organization at the source
of supply."
333 Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 226, at
498 (emphasis added by Court)); see also Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. 17, n.17
(dissenting opinion) (criticizing the majority opinion's contention that a salt applicant's desire to
provoke
an unfair labor practice is impermissibly disloyal under Jefferson Standard).
3
4 Toering Elec. Co., slip op. 4.
335 Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 94-95. The dissenting opinion in Toering Electric further
notes that the Board's burden shifting is inconsistent with the Board's discrimination doctrine
under Section 8(a)(3), which focuses on employer motive rather than the employee's personal
reasons for becoming an employee. Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 18, slip op. 18-19,
336 Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118, slip op. 6 (May 31, 2007) (holding that the
NLRB "will no longer apply a presumption of indefinite employment" in the context of an
employer's discriminatory discharge of a union salt).
337 Cf Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002) (cutting off the
backpay remedy of undocumented workers).
338 Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 & n.9 (1978) ("the right of employees to
selforganize and bargain collectively established by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, necessarily
encompasses the right effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at
the jobsite"); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1972) (holding:
[O]rganization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some
measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of
organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the
Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of
organization rights.).
339 Dana Corp., 8-RD-1976 and Metaldyne Corp., 6-RD-1518/1519, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, slip.
op. 8 (Sept. 29, 2007). Prior to Dana Corp., the union enjoyed an irrebuttable presumption of
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new rule also requires employers and unions to notify employees of their newly
minted right to file a decertification petition or election petition within forty-five
days of receiving notice that their employer has recognized the union under a
neutrality or card-check agreement. Those rules diminish the value of pursuing
voluntary recognition, which some unions have successfully used out of
frustration with the Board's election rules that give employers such advantages as
unlimited captive-audience speeches.
Accordingly, under these rules, a
recognition bar is erected only if "45 days pass from the date of notice without
the filing of a validly [] supported petition. 3 40 The NLRB's modified approach
to voluntary recognition reveals an assault on the principle of majority rule: a
decertification petition supported by 30% of the employees will trump a cardcheck agreement supported by 70% of the employees, thereby forcing the
election.
The NLRB has undoubtedly made it harder to obtain unionization. But it
also seems to be attacking the other end by making it easier to get rid of an
incumbent union. Along these lines, the NLRB, paying lip service to the actualmajority-loss Levitz standard, applies that standard in a manner suggesting a good
faith doubt standard in determining whether an employer may lawfully withdraw
recognition. 342 The irony here, of course, is that the Board, by invoking one test
but applying another, actually commits the same type of error that the Supreme
Court identified in Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB. 343
The result of these alterations is the common belief that our collectivebargaining system has broken down. Private-sector union membership has
declined to single digits 344 and several unions have disaffiliated with the AFLCIO, thereby possibly weakening labor by dividing the movement. There is
hope, but it would mean amending the NLRA and possibly state law.
The most significant reforms would be for Congress to amend the NLRA
by legislatively overruling the many Supreme Court cases cutting back on
workers' rights. First, Congress should legislatively overrule Linden Lumber
Div. v. NLRB,345 which allows employers to insist on an election even when faced
with strong evidence of majority support-a card majority and recognitional
strike. I would instead certify unions based on a majority signed card check.
majority status for a reasonable period of time for the parties to reach agreement on a first contract.
Keller Plastics Eastern, 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966).
340Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, slip. op.
8.
341 id at i.

342 Wurtland Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 50, slip op. 1 (Sep. 29, 2007)
(holding that an employer meets the actual-loss-of-majority standard set forth in Levitz Furniture
Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001) when it relies on an ambiguous employee petition seeking a
vote to remove with signatures from 51% of the unit employees).
34'
522 U.S. 359, 367-71 (1998) (finding that substantial evidence does not support the Board's
application of its "good faith doubt" test).
344
See Bureau of Labor Statistics News, Table 3. Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary
Workers
by
Occupation
and
Industry,
(January
25,
2007),
available at
http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01252007.pdf (noting that private-sector union
membership has declined to 7.4% of those employed, with overall union membership at 12%
because of the substantially higher union density rate among government workers).
34'
419 U.S. 301, 302, 309-10 (1974).
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That action, embodied in the Employee Free Choice Act, passed the House but
was successfully filibustered in the Senate. 34 Congress should also redefine the
term employee more broadly to reinclude supervisors, independent contractors,
and managers. Congress should also take the more radical step of strengthening
economic weapons by broadening the right to strike to include partial work
stoppages. Another way to strengthen the right to strike is to view it as an
individual human right to withdraw one's labor rather than as a collective
economic weapon. Then a union could not waive the individual right to strike
simply by coming to agreement on a contract.
Congress need not amend the NLRA, but they could enact new legislation
that extends bargaining rights to workers in particular circumstances-situations
that place employees in particularly vulnerable positions. For example, Congress
could require employers to bargain with the representatives of its employees
whenever it is contemplating mass layoffs, plant closings, or a change in
ownership. In those cases where the employees are already represented by a
union, the union would serve as the bargaining representative upon the triggering
event. Where there is no union, the employees would have the right (and the
obligation) to select or designate a representative for purposes of bargaining over
the triggering event.347
The NLRB can also play a significant role in bringing the autonomous
dignified worker back to work. As a first step, the NLRB could show that it
takes Section 7 rights seriously by liberally construing employees to cover all
employees, even those employees who might simultaneously be characterized as
employees and students or employees and disabled, rather than using those
reasons as excuses for removing them from the Act's protection. The NLRB
could also significantly dignify and liberate workers by strengthening Section 7's
mutual aid and protection clause, first by returning Weingarten rights to
nonunion workers. The NLRB could also facilitate greater outreach to workers
by explaining that the NLRA applies to anyone who acts in mutual aid or
protection of another.348 The NLRB could also reverse its policy that elections
34 9
are the preferred method for determining employees' representational desires,
by strengthening the avenue for voluntary recognition rights especially if
Congress ultimately fails to enact the Employee Free Choice Act.
Because union access to employer property is more problematic, I would
suggest a more radical solution here. States should follow California's lead and
amend their constitutions to grant individuals expressive conduct rights on
certain private property such as shopping malls, subject to reasonable, content-

346

Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007). See GOP Blocks Union Bill in

Senate, USA TODAY, June 26, 2006, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/200706-26-senate-unions N.htm.
347 Cf Council Directive 98/59/EC.
348 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (spontaneous employee
walkout in
protest of cold working conditions protected).
349 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602-03 (1969).
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neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions.3 5 ° I would also legislatively
overrule the Babcock- Wilcox/Lechmere line of cases-thereby strengthening
employees' rights to receive35information by granting greater access rights to nonemployee union organizers. 1
A legislative floor of rights-minimum wage, social security, universal
public education, universal health care, a living wage, job training/retraining, and
a just cause dismissal law-must be installed. These measures would dignify our
workforce and make our workers more independent thinkers. Moreover, where
employees are not union-represented, changing our default system from
employment at-will to just cause dismissal would go a long way toward
empowering and dignifying workers. A statutory floor of rights that includes a
just cause default dignifies employees by allowing them to participate in their
termination process and forces employers to be good managers by documenting
problems.
CONCLUSION
The social action program outlined above is a modest attempt to show how
relatively slight changes within the capitalist framework would go a long way
toward promoting the autonomous dignified worker by giving her greater
meaning in and control over her life. This lies in stark contrast with the free
market model, which purports to promote autonomy, but only liberates those who
already have or those who compete successfully for more. Free market
proponents justify their position in part by distinguishing between those
deserving and undeserving under their model, thereby inviting state intrusion into
workers' personal lives.

350

Cf Woodruff v. Bd. of Trs. of Cabell Huntington Hosp., 319 S.E.2d 372 (1984) (holding,

among other things, that provisions in a public employees' collective-bargaining agreement violate
Article III, § I of the West Virginia Constitution if they waive employees' fundamental rights, such
as the right to picket or protest). Article III, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution provides that
persons "cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity" of certain inherent rights,
"namely: the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and of pursuing happiness and safety.") W. Va. CONST. art. III, §1. I am grateful to Professor
Bastress for pointing out this section of the West Virginia Constitution.
351 My critical approach exposes problems with the property-rights-based model as applied in a
market economy. As demonstrated by the Babcock-Lechmere doctrine, judges will tend to favor
the state-generated property rights of private property owners even when balanced against federally
protected rights, such as the right to organize embodied in NLRA Section 7. My social-dignitarian
model allows us to think more fundamentally about the questions raised by the free market and
property models. In a future article, I hope to probe those depths, by examining the question what
states can do at the state constitutional level to create fundamental rights for workers. That analysis
is not without its problems. For certain, it will raise (and has already raised) preemption issues.
See, e.g., Lontz v. Tharp, 220 W.Va. 282, 647 S.E.2d 718, 722 (2007) (finding state wrongful
discharge claim preempted by NLRA over well-argued dissent). But those questions, while
difficult, are resolvable, and perhaps show some of the most promising paths toward greater worker
rights. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted,76 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2007) (No. 06-939).
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The debate outlined here between socially conservative free market
proponents and those who wish to promote the autonomous dignified worker can
be placed in the broader debate about government's proper role in national life
that is currently preoccupying the American electorate."' And while the socially
conservative proponent of the free market claims the moral high ground by
grounding his theory in concepts such as the deserving poor and individual
responsibility, the progressive proponent of the autonomous dignified worker has
the true moral high ground by focusing on the human rights of workers as people
and building a workplace foundation from there.
And so this article is an initial inquiry into the foundations of social and
economic justice. By expanding our comprehension of these socio-economic
foundations, I am hopeful that we can rebuild a more dignified workplace that
will treat all people-workers, property owners, managers, and others-with
equal respect and give all people the opportunity to become part author of their
lives, regardless of the roles they play in society.
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